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INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND THE NEW 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
JAYNE W. BARNARD* 
During the last decade, American capital markets have experienced 
a marked shift from a constituency made up primarily of household 
investors to one made up primarily of institutional investors. Institu-
tional investors are fiduciary bodies such as pension funds, mutual 
funds, and employee stock ownership plans, representing large numbers 
of beneficiaries. As collective entitites, institutional investors often amass 
billions of dollars in assets, thus giving them the potential for substantial 
influence on the companies in which they invest. In recent years, some 
institutional investors have sought to use this influence to challenge 
traditional patterns of corporate governance, claiming that new patterns 
of decisionmaking will result in enhanced corporate performance. 
In this Article, Professor Jayne Barnard examines the most com-
monly-advanced institutional proposal for change-the shareholders' 
advisory committee--as well as the larger question of the appropriate 
role of institutional investors in corporate governance. After analyzing 
the changing role of institutional investors, Proftssor Barnard considers 
some of the policy questions raised by increased shareholder activism 
and explores some of the positive and negative consequences which may 
follow from this trend. She concludes that while institutional participa-
tion in corporate governance may have some beneficial impact on man-
agement, institutions should abandon the redundant shareholders' 
advisory committee, and focus instead on the composition and processes 
of the corporate board itself. 
[M]anagement quite naturally is the source of pressure for a to-
tally compatible, comfortable, and supportive board. We need to cre-
ate a countervailing force that works against that tendency toward 
comfort. 1 
The Board is most likely to perform its functions well when im-
portant stockholders are holding a prod to its collective back. 2 
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. 
B.S., 1970, University of Illinois; J.D., 1975, University of Chicago. I am especially grateful for the 
insights shared by Nell Minow in the development of this Article. I also acknowledge the contribu-
tions of the students in my 1990 Seminar on Corporate Governance, who explored some of these 
issues with me, especially Diane A. Davis, Cameron L. Cosby, and Imanuel Arin. The reference 
staffs at the University of Puget Sound Law ~chool and the University of Washington Business 
School libraries provided research assistance. An earlier version of this Article was delivered at a 
Faculty Workshop at George Mason University Law School in October 1990. 
1. Williams, Corporate Accountability: The Board of Directors, 44 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE 
DAY, no. 15, May 15, 1978, at 468, 471, reprinted in BUSINESS ETHICS: READINGS AND CASES IN 
CoRPORATE MORALITY, at 202 (W. Hoffman & J. Moore eds. 1984) (Harold M. Williams was 
Chairman of the SEC when he made this speech.). 
2. Johnson, Making the Board of Directors Function in the Age of Pension Capitalism, in 21ST 
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Most companies are very wary. They regard any large share-
holder not as an asset but as a liability. We can't even get them to 
return our phone calls. 3 
During the 1990 spring proxy season, the California Public Employees Re-
tirement System (CalPERS), a fiduciary body currently managing $58 billion in 
assets, submitted three identical shareholder proposals-to the managements of 
Avon Products Corporation, TRW Corporation, and Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation-seeking to establish a "shareholder's advisory committee" as a 
supplemental body to those companies' existing boards of directors. 4 During the 
same season, Harold C. Simmons, an insurgent seeking control of Lockheed 
Corporation in a vigorously contested proxy fight, won the support of key insti-
tutional investors (though ultimately not the proxy fight itself) by promising 
that, if victorious, he would create a shareholders' advisory committee to coun-
sel Lockheed's board. s 
This concept of a dual governance structure, which has its roots both in the 
West German corporate model6 and the American tradition of an equity secur-
ity holders' committee in bankruptcy, 7 is just one of a number of proposals cur-
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURIDES REGULATION 607 (C. Nathan, H. Pitt & S. Volk eds. 1989) 
(Elmer W. Johnson is former General Counsel and board member of General Motors Corporation). 
3. Bartlett, Big Funds Pressing for Voice in Management of Companies, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 
1990, at D5, col. 5 (quoting Roland M. Machhold, director of New Jersey public pension funds). 
4. In each case, the proposal read as follows: 
RESOLVED, that the Company shall have 
a Shareholder's Advisory Committee to advise the Board of Directors on the interests of 
shareholders. The Board of Directors shall ensure the formation and effective operation of 
this Committee and shall give due consideration to such advice and proposals as shall be 
reported by this Committee to the Board. Members of the Committee shall serve without 
costs to the Company, except that the Committee shall be reimbursed for normal travel 
and operating expenses. The Committee shall be composed of at least nine members and 
shall be reconstituted on an annual basis. The Board shall establish appropriate procedures 
for selection of members, provided that (i) each member is a beneficial owner of at least 
1,000 shares of the company's voting stock for the entire period of membership, (ii) no 
member has any affiliation with the Company other than as a shareholder, and (iii) at least 
five members are selected from the 50 largest beneficial owners of the Company's voting 
shares. No member may serve more than two consecutive terms. 
Letter from Kayla J. Gillan, Assistant General Counsel of CalPERS, to the author (April 5, 1990). 
After the SEC staff declined to issue a No Action letter excluding this proposal from the ballot 
at TRW, CaiPERS withdrew the TRW proposal, as well as the one at Occidental, because TRW 
"agreed to meet with [the fund] to discuss the concept of increased shareholder participation," and 
Occidental "agreed to conduct semi·annual meetings between institutional shareholders and certain 
members •.. of the board of directors." /d. The Avon proposal went forward and was voted on at 
the company's May 3, 1990 annual meeting. See infra text accompanying note 139. 
S. McCartney, New Takeover Tactic: Ballots Instead of Bonds, Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 1990, at 
HlO, col. 4. Management also can use the advisory committee as an instrument for currying favor 
with institutional investors. In the spring of 1990, AmBase, Inc., confronted with widespread claims 
of mismanagement, voluntarily offered to assemble a shareholders' advisory board. Galen, Am base's 
Shareholders Don't Think It Shared Enough, Bus. WK., May 14, 1990, at 41-42. Later that year, 
Healthco International's management assembled a shareholders' advisory committee in response to a 
proxy challenge. Schultz, Shareholder Activism Breaks New Ground with Healtlrco, 16 CORP. FIN. 
WK., Oct. 8, 1990, at 1. 
6. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. 
7. Upon the filing of a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
the United States Trustee may appoint a committee of equity security holders to participate in the 
formulation of the reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(l) (1988). Membership in the commit-
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rently being considered by institutional investors, who are looking not only to 
improve the process of corporate decisionmaking but also to expand their role in 
corporate governance. That role, once essentially passive, in the last three years 
has become markedly more active. Institutional investors increasingly have 
been advancing shareholder proposals under SEC Rule 14a-8,8 joining together 
to thwart management-proposed antitakeover strategies,9 extracting significant 
concessions from contestants in proxy fights, Io pressuring management for desir-
able reforms, II intervening in shareholders' rights litigation, I2 and taking high-
profile positions on corporate governance issues generally. 13 
Today some institutional investors are seeking a more regularized role in 
corporate governance. In support of their efforts, they argue that they have ex-
pertise to contribute to the governance process. Moreover, they claim that insti-
tutional investors must have new incentives, in the form of participation 
opportunities, to ensure their loyalty and long-term investment presence in the 
American capital markets. Pointing to the fact that institutions unsentimentally 
cashed out many of their equity investments during the takeover binge of the 
late 1980s, some organizations now suggest-at least by inference-that they 
may feel as free to move their capital to other equity markets (such as the Euro-
tee "shall ordinarily consist of the persons, willing to serve, that hold the seven largest amounts of 
equity securities ••. of the kinds represented on such committee." Id. § 1102(b)(2) (1988). 
8. See Hanson, Proxy Season: Victories Without Majorities, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, 
July 23, 1990, at 16 (noting proposals by the Florida Board of Administration, Connecticut Retire-
ment and Trust Funds, Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Management Board, and Hous-
ton Firemen's Relief and Retirement Fund); Parker, Funds Gird for Proxy Season, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENT AGE, Nov. 13, 1989, at 92 (describing shareholder proposals submitted by TIAA-
CREF, CalPERS, California State Teachers Group (CalSTRS), the State of Wisconsin Investment 
Board, and the Connecticut Trust Funds). During the 1990 proxy season, institutional investors 
advanced 98 shareholder proposals, of which 13 won a plurality of the shareholder vote. Fromson, 
The Big Owners Roar, FoRTUNE, July 30, 1990, at 67. See generally Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional 
Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REv. 97, 158-59 (1988) (describing 
institutional experiences in 1987 and 1988 using the shareholder proposal rule). 
9. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. 
10. In the Lockheed proxy fight mentioned in the text, see supra text accompanying note 5, 
institutional investors were able to secure three seats on Lockheed's board as the price of their 
support for incumbent management. Stevenson, Lockheed's Moves in Proxy Fight, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
5, 1990, at D2, col. 1. 
11. Big Stockholders May Put Pressure on First Interstate, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1990, at AS, col. 3 
(Institutional manager asserts that "if performance doesn't improve at the Los Angeles multibank 
holding company, he wouldn't hesitate to join with other big investors to force a breakup or sale to 
another banking company."). 
12. CalPERS has intervened in suits challenging UA Corp. (for authorizing payment of $76 
million in investment banking fees to a management group whose LBO efforts failed) and Occidental 
Petroleum (for authorizing over $70 million to construct and maintain the Armand Hammer Mu-
seum of Art). See Ca/PERS Irate Over UAL Merger Fees, MoNEY MGMT. LETTER, Apr. 30, 1990, 
at 4; Grover, What's Good for Armand Hammer May Not Be So Good for Oxy, Bus. WK., Mar. 26, 
1990, at 35. 
13. In November 1989, CalPERS was the first group to file a petition with the SEC seeking 
comprehensive proxy reform. Letter from Richard H. Koppes, General Counsel, California Public 
Employees Retirement System, to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 3, 1989). Since then, the American Bar Association, the 
United Shareholders Association, the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, and the Business 
Roundtable have joined in the reform efforts, though many of these groups disagree on just what 
"reform" is required. 
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pean Community) that will afford them the participation opportunities they 
seek.14 
This Article examines the idea of shareholders' advisory committees and 
the larger question of the appropriate role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance. After tracing the origins of the advisory committee proposal, the 
Article will consider the traditional role of American institutional investors as 
non-participatory providers of capital. It then will examine the very practical 
reasons why this model and its operant counterpart, the "Wall Street Rule," 15 
have become obsolete. The Article then will explore the policy implications of 
institutional investor demands for significant, rather than cosmetic, participation 
in governance matters, and consider some of the hazards which such participa-
tion may generate. Finally, the Article will look at some possible advantages of 
institutional participation in corporate governance, especially the role institu-
tions may play in curbing the tendency toward managerial "groupthink." The 
Article concludes by recommending that institutions abandon the shareholders' 
advisory committee and focus instead on the composition and processes of the 
corporate board itself. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE SHAREHOLDERS' ADVISORY COMMITIEE 
The idea of a representative group of institutional shareholders, whose 
function is to represent shareholders' interests generally and to monitor manage-
ment on behalf of other shareholders, is not new: Adolph Berle in 1928 urged 
that banks holding depositors' shares in trust act as a "permanent protective 
committee" to negotiate for then unavailable financial disclosure and to repre-
sent shareholder interests in the face of managerial abuses.16 Berle's idea was to 
authorize these banks to accept shares in custodian accounts, 
thereby gathering many small holdings into an institution command-
ing a block so large that protection was worth while, and [also provid-
ing] themselves with power to represent the depositors of stock. Such 
institutions could easily keep themselves informed as to the affairs of 
the corporation whose stock was deposited with them and, as repre-
senting their clients, could take the action necessary to prevent or rec-
tify violations of property rights where they occurredP 
Current proposals for shareholders' advisory committees differ from Berte's 
in several ways. Under the current view, shareholders' advisory committees 
would be comprised of several members, rather than relying on a sole monitor. 
14. CalPERS already has moved approximately $9 billion, or more than 15% of its assets, to 
overseas investments. White & Sesit, U.S. Funds Are Rushing Overseas Despite Foreign Market 
Slump, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1990, at C1, col. 4. "[NJearly half of all American pension funds, founda-
tions and endowments have put money abroad or plan to do so." Id. Many overseas companies are 
now actively courting foreign capital by making their governance rules more attractive to interna-
tional investors. Price, German Vote Curbs Under Fire, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Apr. 16, 
1990, at 19 (German companies are considering abandoning rules prohibiting shareholders with 
more than five or ten percent of a company's equity from voting the excess over that percentage). 
15. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
16. A. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE 39 (1928). 
17. /d. 
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These committees would be established on a company-by-company basis, only 
when poor performance suggests the need to change governance practices. 
Committees would be firm-specific, typically comprised of the nine or ten largest 
shareholders willing to serve.18 Committee members would be reimbursed their 
actual expenses by the company, thus spreading the cost among all sharehold-
ers.19 The purpose of the committees would be to provide a forum through 
which shareholders could communicate with board members ancl "[to] institu-
tionalize a procedure for developing and communicating shareholder input."20 
Shareholders' advisory committees by definition would impose costs on cor-
porations and thereby deplete assets otherwise available for reinvestment or for 
distribution to investors.21 Further, many observers consider them unnecessary 
and duplicative at a time when directors themselves, through compensation 
schemes featuring equity-rather than cash-payments, are aligning their inter-
ests more closely with those of their constituents, 22 and thus may be assumed to 
be moving toward a more effective governance role. Some economists argue that 
the confluence of the capital market, the market for managerial labor, and the 
market for corporate control stimulate corporate managers to optimum per-
formance, rendering additional monitoring mechanisms unnecessary.23 Indeed, 
some scholars even argue that the board of directors has become superfluous. 24 
Business executives, too, generally disfavor efforts to establish shareholders' 
advisory committees. They claim to worry about the inhibiting effects of "gov-
ernance by referendum."25 They also argue that advisory committees are likely 
to be comprised primarily of investors with "special interests or motives con-
trary to the interests of the stockholders in general."26 
How is it then, that a structure which would be at least minimally costly 
and might impair the ability of corporate managers to take apJPropriate risks 
seems to be gathering shareholder support?27 And bow, more broadly, does it 
happen that an increasing number of institutional investors are expressing some 
18. See, e.g., the "Texaco proposal," infra note 63. 
19. See, e.g., the "Avon proposal," supra note 4. 
20. AVON PRooucrs, INc., PROXY 25 (Mar. 30, 1990) (statement supporting shareholder 
proposal). ' 
21. See infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
22. KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 
9 (1990) ("In 1989, 24 percent of all respondents provided stock options for their outside directors, 
up from 16 percent in 1988 and three percent five years ago."). 
23. See, e.g., Fischel, The ''Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments 
in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913, 919 (1982); Fischel, The Corporate Govern-
ance Movement, 35 V AND. L. REv. 1259, 1263-64 (1982) [hereinafter Corporate Governance]. 
24. See, e.g., Axworthy, Corporate Directors-Who Needs Them?, 51 Moo. L. REv. 273 (1988). 
25. THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AMERICAN COMPETI-
TIVENESS 16 (1990). As one critic has pointed out: "The inclination of corporate executives to 
make wealth-maximizing but risky decisions might not be improved much by the introduction of a 
class of professional kibitzers who answer to financial intermediaries." Comment, Wimpy Directors 
Likely Result of Proxy Reform, Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1990, at A18, col. 3. 
26. AVON PRODUCI'S, INC., PROXY 28 (Mar. 30, 1990) (statement opposing shareholder 
proposal). · 
27. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
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interest in expanding their governance role? The answer may be found in the 
changing demographics of institutional investors as a group. 
A. Institutions in Their Economic and Political Context 
Four major trends define the behavior of American institutional investors 
over the past five years. First is the asset growth of institutional investors in 
absolute terms. Pension fund assets grew from $1.59 trillion in 1985 to $2.47 
trillion in 1989,28 a fifty-five percent increase; retail mutual fund assets grew 
from $495.5 billion in 1985 to $982.0 billion in 1989,29 a ninety-eight percent 
increase. Second, particularly in the case of pension funds, is the increasing 
allocation of those assets away from traditional debt instruments to higher-risk 
equity investments,30 often on an indexed, rather than on a selective, basis.31 
Third is the intense concentration of institutions' assets in specific companies, 
typically the blue chip companies. For example, the twenty biggest pension 
funds collectively now own more than nine percent of IBM and more than ten 
percent of General Motors. 32 The top twenty pension funds plus the ten largest 
United States money managers now hold more than sixteen percent of the shares 
in the ten largest United States corporations. 33 Experts speculate that by the 
year 2000, the ownership of the ten largest corporations by these thirty share-
holders will range somewhere between twenty-two percent and twenty-nine per-
cent. 34 Fourth is the development of a professional cadre of portfolio 
management professionals and associated proxy-voting advisors.35 All of these 
trends, reflecting the expanded presence of institutions in the equity markets, 
help to explain why institutions are seeking a larger voice in governance matters. 
In considering the changing role of institutional investors, one must look to 
several different categories of these investors: public pension funds, corporate 
pension funds, union pension funds, retail mutual funds, banks and thrifts, in-
28. White, Giant Pension Funds' Explosive Growth Concentrates Economic Assets and Power, 
Wall St. J., June 28, 1990, at C1, col. 3. All institutions now control assets worth $6 trillion, more 
than the GNP of the United States. Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Big Difference?, HARV. Bus. 
REv., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 70. 
29. INVESTMENT CoMPANY INSTITUTE, MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 2 (30th ed. 1990). 
30. White, supra note 28, at col. 4 (in 1970, stocks equalled less than 17% of the assets of state 
and local pension funds; by 1988, stockholdings had increased to 37% of their portfolios). There has 
been a countervailing shift in private pension plans from defined benefit pension plans to defined 
contribution pension plans, which characteristically include a high percentage of fixed-income secur-
ities and a low percentage of equities. Special Report: The New Breed of Pensions That May Leave 
Retirees Poorer, Bus. WK., Nov. 6, 1989, at 164. 
31. Of the $40 billion in equities owned by the New York State retirement funds, $30 billion are 
in indexed portfolios. Taylor, supra note 28, at 72. Overall, approximately 30% of all pension fund 
assets now are held in indexed accounts. Alder, Are Indexed Funds Un-American?, J. PoRTFOLIO 
MGMT., Fall, 1990, at 94. 
32. White, supra note 28, at col. 3. 
33. Taylor, supra note 28, at 71. 
34. Millstein, The Institutional Investor Project at Columbia University-Progress to Date and 
Future Direction, Remarks to the Corporate Governance Workship at Wharton (May 23, 1990), in 
22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 407, 413 (H. Pitt, C. Nathan & S. Yolk 
eds. 1990). 
35. Consulting firms such as lnstititional Shareholder Services, Inc., Analysis Group, Inc., and 
Institutional Voting Research Service, have all come into existence during the last five years. 
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surance and annuity companies, and private foundations. Collectively, the first 
five categories now represent over forty percent of the equity market. 36 Thus, 
the focus here will be on them. 
While decisionmakers within each of these categories are fiduciaries, and 
each of these entities is to some degree regulated, the economic motivations of 
each type of fund and the political context in which each operates may be quite 
different. For example, all pension funds presumably are interested in long-term 
growth and actuarially predictable payouts rather than in short-term perform-
ance or liquidity. Elected officials often oversee public pension funds, and may 
use the proxy arena as a bully pulpit in which to gain public attention. 37 Corpo-
rate pension funds, by contrast, generally are overseen by corporate executives, 
who serve as the "named fiduciary," and by middle-management technocrats, 
whose highest aspirations may be anonymity. Union pension funds under the 
Taft-Hartley Act38 (those established under collective bargaining agreements) 
are administered jointly by management and labor representatives, while non-
Taft-Hartley union funds (those which are funded by union dues) are adminis-
tered by officials selected from union leadership. In all four types of pension 
funds, both the trustees and their in-house fund administrators enjoy job secur-
ity largely unrelated to fund performance. 
Because of their social and organizational loyalties, most corporate pension 
fund fiduciaries and the management-appointed trustees who oversee Taft-Hart-
ley union funds have parallel interests with managers of other corporations, and 
in the event of a contest are likely to identify more with management's, than 
with shareholders', concerns. Because they are not themselves corporate man-
agers, this is less likely to be true of public pension fund trustees and union-
based trustees. The latter, however, may have "other constituency" biases 
which can inhibit an unflinching commitment to shareholder wealth. For exam-
ple, public pension fund trustees sometimes must consider the possibility of lost 
jobs, and lost tax revenues, which may result from the exercise of their share-
holder franchise.39 Union fund trustees similarly may consider the interests of 
36. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CoRPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 144 (concise 6th ed. 
1988). 
37. Examples may include Harrison "Jay" Goldin, fonnerly Comptroller of the City of New 
York, a founder of the Council of Institutional Investors, and a recent candidate for Mayor of the 
City of New York; and Gray Davis, California Controller, member of the CalPERS and CalSTRS 
boards of trustees, co-chair of the Council of Institutional Investors, and an aspirant candidate for 
higher office. Both men have gotten political mileage out of their stands on corporate environmental 
policies and social issues. Alpert, The Shareholders Who Roared, FORTUNE, June 19, 1989, at 161 
(persuading Exxon to put an environmentalist on its board); Bucio & Preston, Koch Sells His Contro-
versial Stock Holdings, Newsday, Jul. 12, 1989 at 6 (doing business in South Africa). 
38. 29 u.s.c. § 141 (1988). 
39. The State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) discovered this in 1987, after it had 
submitted a critical shareholder proposal at General Motors Corp. and summoned GM's top execu-
tives to account for their recent activity. One observer stated: 
The action shook up [GM] Chairman Roger Smith, who agreed to go to Madison and meet 
with the state board. The head of the investment board told Governor Tommy Thompson 
of Smith's impending visit. Thompson had just been elected on a campaign pledge of more 
jobs and a better business environment. Smith happened to be considering expanding a 
truck plant in Janesville, Wisconsin. 
Perry, Who Runs Your Company Anyway?, FORTUNE, Sept. 12, 1988. After a pre-meeting off-the-
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current union members as well as their constituent retirees. 
Most pension funds, regardless of type, contract out a substantial amount of 
the investment decisionmaking and related governance obligations to hired fund 
managers. These fund managers operate in a highly competitive atmosphere in 
which their performance necessarily may be judged on a short-term basis, as 
management contracts come up for renewal. Their continuing employment is 
based entirely upon performance-if not on a quarterly basis, then certainly over 
time. Managers who consistently underperform the median of all fund manag-
ers, for example, are not likely to survive. They are not judged, or rewarded, on 
the basis of their "citizenship" or success in corporate governance. 40 
Fund managers operate at the sufferance of the sponsoring funds' trustees 
and administrators, who may interfere with the exercise of fund proxy voting 
power either by seizing the vote directly or by influencing their fund managers 
indirectly. For example, at least one commentator has alleged that fund spon-
sors often discourage corporate pension fund managers from taking an active 
governance role, threatening them with discontinuation of their contracts.41 
The Department of Labor, as the oversight agency for ERISA employee 
benefit plans, which include corporate pension plans and all union plans, has 
expressed substantial concern in this area.42 In any event, it is not surprising 
that corporate pension funds, as distinguished from public pension funds, have 
not participated at all in the "corporate governance movement." 
Retail mutual funds operate in a very different atmosphere. Unlike pension 
fund beneficiaries, who have a long-term investment horizon, many mutual fund 
investors move freely in and out of their funds. Thus, retail mutual funds must 
have a far higher percentage of liquid assets than pension funds. Because of the 
competitive and highly liquid nature of the industry, mutual fund customers are 
also likely to focus on quarterly or annual results. 
Mutual fund managers are compensated on the basis of prenegotiated an-
nual management fees, generally based on a percentage of the fund's net assets. 
Spending resources on governance matters necessarily will reduce their net man-
agement fee. Thus, most retail mutual fund managers have declined to seek an 
active role in corporate governance matters, often citing the unrecoverable costs 
record dfuner at the Governor's mansion, Smith met with SWIB officials and shortly thereafter, the 
fund announced it was reconsidering its position. Burr, Meeting Eased Concerns; Wisconsin Might 
Not Co-Sponsor GM Resolution, PENSIONS & INvEsTMENT AGE, Jan. 26, 1987, at 94. 
40. L. LoWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND THE 
ABsENTEE SHAREHOLDER 206 (1988). 
41. Fromson, supra note 8 (investment manager Dean LeBaron claims he has lost clients be-
cause of his outspoken opposition to antitakeover devices); see also SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
CoMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON CoRPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 397 (1990) Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPo-
RATE AccoUNTABILITY] (recounting institutional concerns about customer dissatisfaction were 
they actively to exercise their proxy powers). 
42. See Letter from Alan Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor to Helmuth Fandl, 
Avon Products, Inc., 15 PENS. REP. (BNA) 391 (1988) (the "Avon letter'') (reminding ERISA 
fiduciaries to vote shares solely for the benefit of plan beneficiaries). 
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involved.43 Because of special conflict of interest considerations and the adverse 
nature of creditors' rights laws,44 banks, too, have been reluctant to engage in 
high-profile governance pursuits. 
As a consequence of these patterns, until recently, only a handful of institu-
tions have taken an active role in corporate governance matters. Virtually all of 
the activists have been public pension funds headed by salaried executives.45 
That pattern, however, may be changing. Fidelity Investments, which manages 
some $40 billion in equity mutual fund assets, recently changed its investment 
policy restrictions to permit it to participate more actively in proxy contests.46 
Fidelity and the Vanguard Group, Inc., representing $20 billion in equity mu-
tual fund assets, both lobbied against Pennsylvania's aggressive new antitakeover 
law in the spring of 1990.47 
Some private fund managers are said to b~ considering participation in a 
"corporate governance fund," in which investors will pool their resources to 
acquire significant stakes in targeted corporations and then demand a significant 
governance role.48 All things considered, however, corporate pension funds, 
and most retail mutual fund managers, remain reluctant to become involved in 
governance matters. To date, only four union pension funds49 and a dozen or so 
public pension funds out of the thousands in existence have taken an out-front 
role in governance matters. 50 The most outspoken of those taking the lead has 
43. Ring, Mutual Fund Activism Unlikely, PENSIONS & INvESTMENT AGE, Jan. 22, 1990, at 
75. 
44. See J. NORTON & W. BAGGETT, LENDER LIABILITY LAW AND LmGATIONpassim (1990) 
(describing numerous theories under which lenders may be held liable for borrower's conduct). 
45. Cf. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH L. R.Ev. 520, 606 (1990) ("All ma-
jor institutions have significant conflicts of interest; all but public pension funds have incentives to 
keep corporate managers happy."). The occasional exception to this statement may be found in 
union pension funds. For example, the United Mine Workers Union in 1989 sponsored three share· 
holder proposals at the Pittston Company, where mine workers had been on strike since Apri11988. 
Forming a group called the Pittston Independent Shareholders Committee, comprised of mine work-
ers who owned Pittston shares, the UMW sought shareholder approval of proposals challenging 
Pittston's poison pill and advocating confidential proxy voting and the establishment of a committee 
to explore opportunities for restructuring, all typical shareholders' rights proposals. The UMW's 
real goal, however, was to gain leverage in its labor dispute. See Parker, Miner.; Lead Proxy Bid: 
Claim Fight is Unrelated to Labor Dispute, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, May 1, 1989, at 1. The 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, the International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers, and the Paperworkers Union have also ventured into the world of shareholder activ-
ism, albeit on a limited basis. 
46. Ring, supra note 43, at 75. 
47. Marr, Anti-takeover Bill Threatens Shareholders, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Mar. 5, 
1990, at 14. 
48. Rosenbaum & Korens, Institutional Shareholder Activism and Related Proposals for Legis-
lative and Regulatory Changes to Corporate Governance Rules, in PROXY CONTESTS, INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTOR INmATIVES AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSES 1990, at 628. (K. Eppler & T. 
Gilroy eds.). CalPERS may be ahead of the private funds in this regard. It already has placed two 
directors on the board of Santa Fe Pacific Realty, of which it owns 19.9%. Hemmerick, A Test for 
California Fund-Officials to Get Hand in Directing Company's Fonune, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT 
AGE, June 11, 1990, at 36. 
49. See supra note 45. 
50. The following public pension funds have submitted shareholder proposals on corporate gov-
ernance issues to date-CalPERS, the California State Teachers Retirement System, the State of 
Connecticut Retirement and Trust Funds, the Florida State Board of Administration, the New York 
City Employees' Retirement System, the New York City Fire Department Pension Fund, the New 
York City Police Department Pension Fund, the New York City Teachers' Retirement System, th.e 
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been the California Public Employees Retirement System. 
B. The Ca/PERS Agenda 
CalPERS has been active in corporate governance issues since 1984, when 
then-state Treasurer Jesse M. Unruh, an influential member of the CalPERS 
board, discovered greenmail. In an often-told story, Unruh one day read that 
Texaco's management had just paid $1.3 billion-representing a premium of $40 
million over market-to buy back two million of its shares that recently had 
been purchased by the Bass brothers.51 Inasmuch as CalPERS was the largest 
single Texaco shareholder, Unruh convened his staff to question the transaction: 
"Do you mean these people can elect to buy out one class of share-
holder at $55 and leave the rest of us in at $35?" Unruh asked the 
CalPERS staff. Yes, they can, they told him. "Like helll" said 
Unruh. 52 
Other episodes, such as the greenmail payment by Walt Disney Productions 
to Saul Steinberg in 1984, led Unruh to convene the Council of Institutional 
Investors. 53 Unruh later demanded dialogue between major shareholders and 
the managements of poorly performing companies, such as General Motors, and 
lobbied in favor of statutory one share/one vote guarantees. 54 Unrult's recur-
ring theme was "if [shareholders] don't show some activity, they are going to get 
screwed;"55 or, equally graphic, "Right now, it's like we're getting raped and we 
can't fight back."56 
The specific impetus toward shareholders' advisory committees traces to 
the lawsuit filed by Pennzoil Co. against Texaco, Inc. in 1984, arising out of 
Pennzoil's aborted purchase of Getty Oil Co. 57 Pennzoil ultimately secured a 
judgment against Texaco for $10.3 billion, and Texaco, unable to post a superse-
deas bond to pursue its appellate rights, filed for protection under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code in April 1987.58 
Pennsylvania Public School Employees' Retirement System, and the State of Wisconsin Investment 
Board. J. BIERSACH, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IS· 
SUES 1N :rHE 1990 PROXY SEASON app. B (1990); L. KRASNOW, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL IN· 
VESTORS ON CORfORATE GOVERNANCE IssUES IN THE 1989 PROXY SEASON app. A (1989). In 
addition, TIAA/CREF, which represents many public as well as private university employees, has 
submitted shareholder proposals. 
51. Perry, supra note 39, at 141. 
52. /d. 
53. Council of Institutional Investors is Becoming a Force to be Reckoned With in Corporate 
Takeover Plotting, AM. BANKER, Oct. 29, 1985, at 40. CII now has more than 60 members, repre-
senting $300 billion in assets. The story of the greenmail payments in the Disney case is recounted in 
J. TAYLOR, STORMING THE MAGIC KINGDOM-WALL STREET, THE RAIDERS, AND TUB BATTLE 
FOR DISNEY (1987). 
54. Power, Shareholders Aren't Just Rolling Over Anymore, Bus. WK., Apr. 27, 1987, at 32, 33. 
55. /d. 
56. A Move to Make Institutions Start Using Their Stockholder Clout, Bus. WK., Aug. 6, 1984, 
at 70. 
57. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 
u.s. 994 (1988). 
58. In re Texaco, Inc., 77 Bankr. 433, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). The Pennzoil case ulti-
mately was settled in 1988 for $3 billion. 
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As authorized by Chapter 11, the Bankruptcy Judge appointed both a cred-
itors' committee and an equity security holders' committee to participate in the 
structuring of Texaco's reorganization plan. Several institutioltlal investors, 
though eligible to serve on the equity security holders' committee, declined for 
fear of insider trading liability in the event they were to trade while serving. 59 
CalPERS, by contrast, sought committee membership but was thwarted by a 
bankruptcy statute that excludes governmental entities from serving on commit-
tees.60 Nevertheless, CalPERS and its rust-belt counterpart, the Pennsylvania 
Public School Employees' Retirement System, ultimately were authorized by the 
bankruptcy court to serve as non-voting members of the equity sec::urity holders' 
committee and later played an instrumental role in crafting Texaco's ultimate 
settlement with Pennzoil and the company's emergence from Chapter 11.61 
During these events, CalPERS's officials saw the potential for shareholders' 
advisory committees outside of bankruptcy. The issue that stimulated the fund's 
interest was director selection. During the summer of 1988, CallE'ERS and the 
New York State & Local Retirement Systems approached Texaco seeking a role 
for institutional investors in the nomination of director candidates to be elected 
at the 1989 shareholders' meeting.62 When discussions on this issue collapsed in 
December, CalPERS submitted a shareholder proposal that would have estab-
lished a permanent shareholders' advisory committee upon the dissolution of the 
equity security holders' committee in bankruptcy.63 The proposed committee 
would have as its primary responsibility a specific role in directoral selection and 
59. Burr, New Fund Activism: Two Play Role in Texaco Settlement, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT 
AGE, Mar. 7, 1988, at 1, 38. 
60. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(35) (" 'person' •.• does not include governmental unit"); 1102(b)(2) 
("A committee of equity security holders ••. shall ordinarily consist of •.. persons.") (1988). 
61. Burr, supra note 59, at 1. 
62. Parker, Institutions Rethinking Board Seat at Texaco, PENSIONS & INvEsTMENT AGE, July 
25, 1988, at 2. 
63. Parker, Texaco Impasse: Plan for Permanent Committee on Table, PENSIONS & INVEST-
MENT AGE, Dec. 12, 1988, at 1. The text of this proposal read: 
The Company shall have a Stockholders' Advisory Committee to advise the Board of 
Directors on the views and interests of stockholders. The Board of Directom, through the 
Chairman of the Board, shall ensure the formation and effective of the Committee. The 
Committee shall adopt such bylaws as it deems appropriate. The annual operating ex-
penses of the Committee, which shall not exceed the annual operating expenses of the 
Board of Directors, shall be borne by the Company. 
The Committee shall be composed of nine members, and shall be reconstituted on an 
annual basis. No member may serve more than three consecutive terms. Tite members of 
the Committee shall include (a) the five eligible stockholders who beneficially own the 
greatest number of shares of the Company's common (determined annually as of the rec-
ord date for the annual meeting of stockholders) (the "Ranking Stockholders") and who 
nominate themselves by submitting their names and proof of beneficial ownership in writ-
ing to the Secretary of the Company within 30 days after each annual meeting of stock-
holders, and (b) four persons elected by a majority vote of the Ranking Stockholders from 
among stockholders who similarly nominate themselves ("At Large Stockholders"), pro-
vided that each At Large Stockholder must be the beneficial owner of at least 1,000 shares 
of the Company's common stock, and further provided that no At Large Stockholder may 
be an officer, director or affiliate of the Company. If a member of the Committee ceases to 
be a beneficial owner of the common stock of the Company, such member shall no longer 
be eligible to serve on the Committee. 
Letter from Richard H. Koppes, CalPERS Chief Counsel, to the author (August 22, 1989). 
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a broader, ongoing role in other governance matters. 64 Texaco quickly diffused 
this proposal by placing a CalPERS-recommended nominee-New York Uni-
versity president John Brademas-on the company's official board slate, and by 
responding to other concerns expressed by CaiPERS and the equity security 
holders' committee, notably those related to criteria for the selection of future 
board members and the retention of Texaco's poison pill. 65 Satisfied with its 
achievements, CalPERs withdrew its advisory committee proposal66 and, with 
the close of the bankruptcy case, the Texaco equity security holders' committee 
was disbanded. CalPERS continued, however, to search its portfolio for other 
poorly-performing companies and those it regarded as "insensitive" to share-
holders' interests.67 By the end of 1989, it had focused on Avon, TRW and 
Occidental, and at each of these firms resurrected the advisory committee idea. 6B 
Some observers might argue that CalPERS's foCal role in these events 
marks both the beginning and the end of the "movement" toward shareholders' 
advisory committees. CalPERS frequently has taken the lead on issues related 
to shareholder activism and found itself with few followers. 69 Its current chief 
executive officer, Dale Hanson, has become something of a "guru" in the share-
holders' rights movement. 70 . Some may claim that the idea of shareholders' ad-
visory committees represents little more than one man's preoccupation. 
Assume, however, as the evidence suggests, that institutional support for 
advisory committees goes beyond the boundaries of California, and is shared by 
a range of institutions, including many institutions other than public pension 
funds. When institutional investors were asked in 1990 whether they supported 
the idea of shareholders' advisory committees, 44.7 percent of the respondents 
answered yes, "at least at those companies that are troubled."71 In another 1990 
survey, fifty-five percent of the responding institutions expressed a willingness to 
support shareholders' advisory committees, at least on a case-by-case basis.72 
This support may be motivated by the belief that institutional involvement in 
corporate governance can improve corporate performance as it has in other cui-
64. /d. 
65. Business Wire Inc., CalPERS and Texaco reach accord, CalPERS press release, Feb. 9, 
1989 (on file with the author). 
66. /d. 
67. Koppes & Gillan, The Role of Pension Fund Investon in the Election of Corporate Directon, 
INSIGHTS, Dec. 1988, at 11, 13. 
68. See supra note 4. 
69. For example, CalPERS is one of only a handful of shareholder sponsors of the "Valdez 
Principles," a package of environmental practices being urged on pollution-prone companies, pri· 
marily by environmentalist groups. See Barnard, Exxon Collides with the "Valdez Principles", 14 
Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 32 (Summer 1990). 
70. fu 1989, Fortune Magazine asserted that "Dale Hanson has become to shareholders what 
Joan of Arc was to France." The Year~ 25 Most Fascinating Business People, FoRTUNE, Jan. 2, 
1989, at 32, 37. 
71. Pens{onforum: Speaking Out, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July, 1990, at 203. Sixty-four 
percent of the public funds polled favored this view, as did 35 percent of the corporate respondents. 
/d. 
72. J. BIERSACH, supra note 50, at 54. In a similar survey of institutional investors conducted 
in late 1989, SO% of the respondents indicated they would consider on a case by case basis voting in 
favor of a shareholders' advisory committee. L. KRASNOW, supra note 50, at 28. 
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tures, notably Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan, as described in the 
next section of this Article. 
C. The German Dual-Governance Model 
An essential model for the shareholders' advisory committee is the German 
Aktiengesellschaft (AG), or public company, which is governed not by a unitary 
board of directors, as in the United States, but by two separat(: and distinct 
bodies: the Vorstand, or management board, and the Aufsichtsrat, or supervi-
sory board. The relationship between these bodieS is both collegial and 
hierarchical: 
The Vorstand runs the company. It is responsible for the perl'ormance 
of the company and represents the company to the public, whereas the 
Aufsichtsrat supervises the activities of the Vorstand. The Aufsicht-
srat is not allowed to interfere in the policymaking of the Vorstand. 
This organizational structure was chosen in order to have a clear divi-
sion of responsibilities between the Vorstand and the Aufsichtsrat. 
In addition to the supervisory function, two other prim•e tasks of 
the Aufsichtsrat are to hire the members of the Vorstand and to ap-
prove the yearly balance sheet and profit statement. 73 
Certain decisions, such as those related to investment and financing, typically 
are initiated by the Vorstand, but statutorily are allocated to theAufsichtsrat.14 
Because of the tradition of codetermination, and the consequent presence 
on theAufsichtsrat of a substantial contingent (up to fifty percent) oflabor repre-
sentatives,75 theAufsichtsrat is not a perfect model for an American sharehold-
ers' advisory committee. The role of the shareholders' represetJtatives on the 
Aufsichtsrat, however, does illuminate the ways in which a shareholders' advi-
sory committee might function. 
Shareholders' representatives on the Aufsichtsrat are generally "bankers, 
businessmen or representatives of the public. "76 Bankers play an especially 
prominent role because their employers often serve as trustees or assignees of 
publicly-owned shares, and therefore have a large percentage of the votes at their 
command.77 Moreover, banks themselves maintain significant stock positions in 
a number of companies-a fact traceable in part to the small universe of avail-
able investments: there are fewer than 500 publicly-traded German companies.'8 
73. J. BACON & J. BROWN, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES IN 
NINE CoUNTRIES 28 (1977). 
74. Id. 
75. See generally Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of Devel-
opments in European Community and United Sta,tes Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1459, 1483-85 (1984) 
(describing the role of worker representatives on the German Aufsichtsrat). 
76. J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 73, at 28. 
77. Id. One observer has asserted that, "[a]t the general meetings of widely-held corporations, 
these portfolio-managing banks account for over 90% of the voting rights, because of the rights 
transferred to them by their clients." Kallfass, The American Corporation and the Institutional In-
vestor: Are There Lessons/rom Abroad? The German Experience, 1988 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 775, 
782. As significant is the fact that 45% of all privately-held shares are voted by just three banks-
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank. Id. at 783. 
78. Givant, U.S. Urged to Follow Europe, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, May 30, 1988, at 6. 
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The banks whose employees are represented on the Aufsichtrat are often, of 
course, lenders to the company as well, with access to a wealth of operating 
data. 
Due largely to the dominance and expertise of these bankers, German su-
pervisory boards have become very effective in monitoring management, and, 
unlike American boards, are often the chief executives' "fiercest critics":79 
As so often in business affairs, the supervisory boards have become 
quite the opposite of what softhearted reformers intended. Conceived 
by the Allied occupiers after World War II, [the German] supervisory 
board composed of representatives of labor, the company's bankers, 
and society as a whole was set apart from the executive board. . . . Its 
purpose was to force companies to take into account the views of vari-
ous constituencies besides the stockholders. 
As it turned out, the Germans have made their supervisory boards 
the most stringent possible watchdogs for stockholders. . . . A repre-
sentative of a large German bank is likely to be the dominant figure on 
a big company's supervisory board. The bankers compare the com-
pany's record with what is happening to other companies under their 
bank's wing. Given the banker's expertise, the other directors gener-
ally follow his lead in keeping management on a tight leash. 80 
The monitoring role played by conservative German bankers is said to em-
phasize long-term, rather than short-term, shareholder gain.81 This may be an 
easy preference in a culture in which uninvited takeovers "simply do not ex-
ist."82 Additionally, however, the practice of aggressive, comparative, and in-
formed oversight apparently has proven effective in maximizing shareholder 
wealth83 as well as positioning German companies for international 
competitiveness. 
Similar, though less formal, dual-governance formulae have emerged in Ja-
pan and, to a lesser degree, in the United Kingdom. In Japan, for example, 
significant blocks of shares in many companies are held by antei kabunushi, or 
"stable stockholders," which typically include the companies' primary banks, 
suppliers and customers. "[B]anks and other corporate entities own more than 
sixty percent of the combined stock of the firms listed on Japan's stock ex-
changes."84 These shareholders are well-integrated into corporate decisionmak-
ing. For example, CEOs representing corporate owners meet regularly "to 
discuss matters of common concern and to coordinate their business strate-
gies."85 Even though they are prohibited by law from owning any more than 
five percent of the shares of any company, bank shareholders "exercise a virtual 
79. Macrae, Wanted: Blue Blood for American Boards, Bus. MoNTH, Apr., 1990, at 16. 
80. /d. 
81. Kallfass, supra note 77, at 790. 
82. /d. at 776. 
83. See Dorfman, Investing in a West German Stock Boom, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1989, C1, col. 3 
(describing vitality of West German equity markets prior to reunification). 
84. Hiroshi, The Closed Nature of Japanese Intercorporate Relations, in INSIDE THE JAPANESE 
SYSTEM 61 (D. Okimoto & T. Rohlen eds. 1988). 
85. Wright, Networking-Japanese Style, Bus. Q., Autumn 1989, at 20, 21. 
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veto power over management decisions."86 Institutional owners are regularly, 
albeit subtly, consulted on executive succession issues.87 
In the U.K. the "Pro-Ned" organization (Promotion of Non-Executive Di-
rectors), formed in 1982 by a consortium headed by the Bank of England, the 
Stock Exchange, and institutional investors, has created and trained a group of 
nearly 400 professional, full-time, independent corporate directors, and has facil-
itated their placement on listed company boards. Pro-Ned coordinates these 
directors' activities on corporate governance issues and lobbies on their behalf in 
Parliament. In addition, four industry associations representing member institu-
tions (insurance companies, pension funds, trusts, and investment companies) 
have combined to act on behalf of their members in emergency situations requir-
ing shareholder action, such as negotiating to minimize greenmail payments. 88 
In each of these cultures, corporate executives have accommodated institu-
tional investors as important participants in the governance process. In the 
United States, to date, they have not. 
D. The Demise of the "Wall Street Rule" 
The conventional wisdom, repeatedly delivered since Berle and Means pub-
lished The Modern Corporation and Private Property89 in 1932 has been that, in 
the absence of a control position, equity investors-even those with substantial 
holdings-are essentially powerless to influence corporate policies. Their indi-
vidual votes count for "little or nothing,"90 and consequently are rarely used as 
an "instrument of democratic contro1."91 
The explanation for this phenomenon has been simple-dispersed share-
holders suffer from the same problems of collective action as other politically 
disenfranchised people: (1) The cost of individual action is high and unlikely to 
result in a commensurate reward, and (2) the incentives toward collective action 
are inadequate. In other words, 
because no compulsory cost-sharing mechanism exists [for sharehold-
ers wishing to oppose a management policy], and because no single 
shareholder can capture the whole gain to shareholders generally from 
the proposal's defeat, there will be insufficient incentive to organize 
opposition. 92 
86. /d. at 21, 23. 
87. Anderson, Corporate Directors in Japan, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1984, at 30, 31. 
88. See Lowenstein & Millstein, The American Corporation and the Institutional Investor: Are 
There Lessons from Abraad? Introduction, 1988 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 739, 748. Overall, "in [the] 
U.K. there is significantly greater interaction [than in the U.S.] between institutional investors and 
the corporations that they hold stakes in." ld. 
89. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
90. Id. at 86. 
91. Id. at 89. Thirty-five years after his book's initial publication, Berle reiterated this view: 
The stockholders' right to vote "is of diminishing importance as the number of shareholders in each 
corporation increases--diminishing in fact to negligible importance as the corporations become gi-
ants." A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY xix (rev. 
ed. 1968). 
92. Fischel, Corporate Governance, supra note 23, at 1277; Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class 
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In addition to this "free rider'' explanation for shareholder passivity, commenta· 
tors have offered another explanation: investor deference to managerial 
expertise. 
[N]o reason exists why investors, who provide the finn with capital in 
anticipation of receiving a certain rate of return generated by the firm's 
assets, should have any input into the finn's decisionmaking processes. 
On the contrary, investors are willing to supply capital, as opposed to 
starting and operating the enterprise themselves, precisely because they 
trust the expertise of professional managers. Moreover, the rational 
(risk-averse) shareholder may well attempt to diversify his portfolio by 
investing in many firms or in a mutual fund. The investor who holds 
securities in multiple firms is unlikely to have the interest or expertise 
to participate in running any particular firm. . . . Shareholders would 
be hurt rather than helped if they were given more power, which no 
doubt explains why they show no enthusiasm for the constant propos-
als to increase their role.93 
These descriptions of shareholder behavior typically have been accompa-
nied by a prescription, commonly known as the "Wall Street Rule." This rule 
defines appropriate shareholder action in the event a corporation's performance 
declines: "If a shareholder is dissatisfied, the more logical course in most cases 
is simply to sell one's shares."94 In other words, the assumption has been that 
shareholders are best off when they remain rationally ignorant of the details of a 
finn's operations, inform themselves only by reference to the finn's market price, 
and sell when that price becomes unsatisfactory given their overall investment 
objectives. The apotheosis of this view emerged when academics recently called 
for the abolition of the New York Stock Exchange's one (common) share/one 
vote rule.95 
Although the behavioral assumptions explaining shareholder passivity are 
compelling with regard to individual shareholders with small holdings, for 
whom the mere mechanics of voting are often so burdensome that they return 
their proxies signed but unmarked, or fail to return them at all, these assump-
tions apply as well to institutional investors. As Professors Easterbrook and 
Fischel pointed out in 1983, "professional money managers operate in a highly 
competitive industry where the liquidity of assets makes it relatively easy to as-
sess managers' performance and shift from one investment to another. . . . [In-
Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 44 (1988); Levmore, 
Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 60 (1982). 
93. Fischel, Corporate Governance, supra note 23, at 1276-77. Other explanations have been 
given for shareholder passivity, most recently in Black, supra note 45, at 530-60 (arguing that share-
holder passivity is attributable not to economic factors, but to artificially imposed legal impediments 
to shareholder voting, such as the federal proxy rules, ERISA constraints on trustee behavior, and 
state anti-takeover statutes). 
94. Fischel, Corporate Governance, supra note 23, at 1277; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, 
Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. LAW & EcoN. 395, 396-97 (1983) (shareholders express their views 
by buying and selling shares; because they lack infonnation, they should not attempt to influence 
corporate managers by other means). 
95. See, e.g., Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 
U. CHI. L. REv. 119, 135-42 (1987) (citing the advantages in eliminating the one share-one vote 
rule). 
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stitutions'] perceived unwillingness to [expend scarce. resources on information-
gathering and voting] is no doubt rational behavior."96 
Easterbrook and Fischel's position may have been correct in 1983.97 Now, 
however, many pension funds and large mutual funds have grown to the point 
where the aggregate size of their holdings and the amount invested in a given 
corporation's stock are so large as to preclude reliance on the Wall Street 
Rule.98 
Consider the situation of a large state employees' pension fwnd (Fund) that 
grows by hundreds of millions of dollars in a given year. Last year, Fund ac-
quired 250,000 of the common shares of Bigco, a blue chip, big board stock. Say 
the purchase was at forty dollars per share, and the 250,000 shares represent one 
percent of Bigco's equity. (Like many funds, Fund is limited by its charter to 
acquiring no more than five percent of any single company's shares.) Now, two 
years later, Fund is dissatisfied with Bigco's languor in the market: the shares 
now trade at thirty five dollars. Even with negotiated commission rates, the 
transaction costs to Fund of bailing out of Bigco are likely to b~ substantial.99 
Even worse, if Fund unloads its Bigco common stock all at once, the price may 
be depressed below thirty five dollars, further increasing Fund's loss.100 Fund 
will also have to bear the cost of finding a substitute investment. Consequently, 
it is not difficult to see that Fund may be better off working to improve Bigco's 
performance than (in the absence of a takeover premium) selling out Bigco.101 
This scenario assumes that Fund acquired its Bigco shares on a "managed 
96. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 94, at 426. 
97. But see SEC STAFF REPORT ON CoRPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 41, at 393-94 
(describing the inability in 1979 of some institutional investors to divest their individual holdings 
without depressing market price). 
98. OUR MONEY'S WORTH, THE REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON PENSION 
FUND INVESTMENT 37 (1989) [hereinafter CUOMO CoMMISSION REPORT]: 
[L]arge pension funds have found that the individual investor/exit response model is not 
always practical, nor is it consistent with the special qualities oflarge pension funds. While 
severe underperformers and big winners may be sold, pension systems increasingly cannot 
"vote with their feet" because their assets are too large and the duty to diversify too impor-
tant to rely upon a strategy that says "sell" every time an investment under-performs. The 
universe of quality investments is just not big enough for large permanent investors to 
regularly move in and out of individual stocks or bonds. 
99. Institutions' transaction costs now run between two and eight cents per share. Welles, The· 
Future of Wall Street, Bus. WK., Nov. 5, 1990, at 119. 
100. The loss may be exacerbated if other funds decide to sell their Bigco shares at the same time 
Fund is looking for a buyer. See Dent, Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corpo-
ration, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 881, 922-23. 
101. Professors Gilson and Kraakman argue that institutional focus on only certain companies 
may be self defeating. 
Many improvements affecting the value of one company in an indexed portfolio come only 
at the expense of other companies in the portfolio. For example, the institutional investor 
does not gain when one of its portfolio companies simply acquires market share at the 
expense of another. From the portfolio holder's point of view, this improvement merely 
transfers money from one pocket to another, both in the same pair of pants. 
Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 
STAN. L. REv. 863, 866 (forthcoming 1991). While it may be true, this observation does not take 
into account the fact that businesses may increase value other than by raiding a competitor's market 
share. Businesses may create new markets, either by creating new products for which there are no 
current competitors or by entering new geographic areas with existing products. 
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fund" basis; that is, Fund made a considered decision to buy Bigco, as opposed 
to other stocks, and has the resources to locate a substitute. Fund's dilemma 
· may be exacerbated if instead it acquired its Bigco shares as part of a basket of 
shares or an "indexed fund." Indexing assumes that an investor is diversified 
throughout an entire community of shares (for example, an indexed portfolio 
organized around the Standard & Poor's 500 will have shares in each of the S&P 
500 companies); and that, over time, the performance of the entire index, left 
untouched, will outperform managed funds. Indexing permits an investor to 
eliminate research costs and transaction costs attendant to selective trading. 
If Fund is indexing properly, it effectively is trapped in its Bigco shares. If 
it were to follow the Wall Street Rule, not only would it take a loss on its sale 
and incur substitution costs but more importantly, the act of selling and rein-
vesting out of the index (or redeploying the cash to other shares within the in-
dex, excluding Bigco) would distort the whole point of indexing. Thus, indexed 
funds by definition will have little if any turnover; even managed funds now are 
endeavoring to minimize their turnover and attendant transaction costs.102 
With the embrace by institutions of indexing, 103 the Wall Street Rule has 
been replaced by the notion that these shareholders, rather than selling their 
shares, should use their resources to improve those shares' performance. Often 
referred to as the "voice," rather than the "exit," option,104 this preference, to-
gether with the demographic patterns discussed above, has led to an entirely new 
persona for institutional investors-as "patient capitalists"10S who demand that 
their governance views be heard. 
II. THE TILT TOWARD PARTICIPATION 
While few voting statistics are available predating 1985, when the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center began maintaining market-wide proxy voting 
records, there is evidence that shareholder participation in governance, like 
shareholder selling and buying, for decades looked as one would have pre-
dicted-characterized by low voter turnout, infrequent resistance to manage-
ment proposals, and very few shareholder proposals other than those brought by 
individuals or religious groups seeking social reform. 106 As late as 1988, the 
Department of Labor, which oversees ERISA employee benefit plans, was ex-
pressing concern that many pension fund managers were ignoring their fiduciary 
duty to engage in considered shareholder voting, either by succumbing to undue 
influence from management or by failing to vote altogether.1°7 
102. Welles, supra note 99, at 119. 
103. See supra note 31. 
104. The term derives from A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LoYALTY: RESPONSES TO DB· 
CLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4-5 (1970). 
105. This term was coined in the CUOMO CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98. 
106. See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CoRPORATE SECRETARIES, INC., REPORT ON SHAREHOLDER 
PROPOSALS (1975-1989). 
107. Department of Labor Pension & Welfare Benefits Administration Press Release 88-241, 
PWBA Announces Enforcement Project to Monitor Investment Managers Voting Proxies of Employee 
Benefit Plan, May 11, 1988. 
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Throughout the early 1980s, management-initiated proposrus-including 
share-depressing antitakeover proposals-rarely were defeated and shareholder-
initiated proposals on significant economic (as opposed to social) issues virtually 
never passed or, indeed, received more than a token vote of approval. Institu-
tional proposals were rare. 108 
By 1987, however, the tide had begun to turn. During the 1987 proxy sea-
son, the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), then representing over $30 
billion in pension fund assets, the California State Teachers' Retirement System 
and the State of Wisconsin Investment Board-allloosely organized through the 
Council of Institutional Investors-undertook a series of shareholder proposals 
aimed at challenging the poison pills of forty American companies. 109 At last, 
these institutions had discovered an issue on which they were prepared to initi-
ate some action. 
Adoption of a poison pill has a negative impact on share value.110 The 
shareholder proponents in 1987 argued that shareholders had the right to be 
consulted about, and indeed to ratify or reject, management's desire to adopt a 
poison pill. 111 More than fifty anti-pill proposals were submitteol in 1987, and 
the overall average shareholder vote on these proposals was 27.4 percent. 112 
The following year, the average vote on shareholder-initiated anti-pill proposals 
increased to 38.7 percent113 and by 1990, the average vote was 42.7 percent. 114 
The runaway takeover market of the 1980s, and the sophisticated ways in which 
managers resisted that market, had created the occasion for institutional inves-
tors to rethink their passive role. 
The situation was simple-many public companies were revealed as having 
been undervalued substantially. Changing their governance structure by priva-
tizing them in leveraged buyouts had liberated billions of dollars for sharehold-
ers. Some companies commanded more than a fifty percent premium over 
market. 115 Management interference with the market for corporate control was 
an issue over which even the most lethargic of institutions coulo1 get involved, 
and a particularly astute handful of them did just that, with the result that, in 
1991, shareholder behavior looks quite different from that predicted by tradi-
tional theories of collective action. 
108. During the 1986 proxy season, only 33 proposals on any topic were submitted by institu-
tional shareholders. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CoRPORATE SECRETARIES, INC., REPORT ON SHARE-
HOLDER PROPOSALS JULY 1, 1988 - JUNE 30, 1989, at 3 (1989). 
109. Nussbaum, The Battle for Corporate Control, Bus. WK., May 18, 1987, at 102; Power, supra 
note 54, at 32. In 1987 institutions submitted 167 shareholder proposals. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
CoRPORATE SECRETARIES, INC., supra note 108, at 3. 
110. See SECURmES & EXCHANGE CoMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF EcONOMIST, THE EF-
FEcrs OF POISON PILLS ON THE WEALTH OF TARGET SHAREHOLDERS (1986); Choi, Kamma & 
Weintrop, The Delaware Courts, Poison Pills, and Shareholder Wealth, 5 J. LAW EcoN. & ORG. 375, 
376 (1989); Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 
377, 385 (1988). 
111. Ryan, supra note 8, at 158-59. 
112. Id. at 159. 
113. Id. 
114. Both Shareholders, Management Rack Up Proxy Wins, 7 IRRC CORP. GOVERNANCE 
BULL., July-Aug. 1990, at 90. 
115. Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, 64. 
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First, as I have noted elsewhere, shareholders now vote in surprisingly large 
numbers given the issues generally at stake; more importantly, they vote with a 
high level of discrimination among the issues presented to them for a vote.1 16 
Thus, even in situations not involving contests for control, shareholders are be· 
coming increasingly active in their voting behavior.117 Moreover, as they vote, 
shareholders are increasingly resistant to the knee-jerk tendency to support man· 
agement under all circumstances. 
Second, shareholders are engaging in more and more collective action. 
Substantial evidence illustrates that, since 1988, shareholders generally and insti· 
tutional investors in particular have been acting successfully in concert, by, for 
example, organizing resistance to unacceptable managerial conduct, 118 organiz· 
ing affirmative campaigns to effectuate corporate reforms119 and seizing the 
moral high ground on such corporate governance issues as golden parachutes, 
greenmail, and confidential voting.12o 
The most successful collective action to date occurred during the 1989 
proxy season, when investor Richard Rainwater, CalPERS, and the Penn· 
sylvania Public Schools Employees' Retirement System joined together to defeat 
two antitakeover proposals that management at Honeywell, Inc. had submitted 
to its shareholders. Although the California and Pennsylvania funds collectively 
represented less than five percent of Honeywell's shares, Rainwater, CalPERS, 
and the Pennsylvania Public Schools Employees' Retirement System organized a 
campaign among other institutional investors to defeat these proposals. 121 Their 
efforts included hiring a proxy solicitor and engaging the support of a prominent 
proxy-voting consulting firm, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. Both an· 
titakeover proposals were defeated122 and Honeywell's share price rose from 
seventy dollars per share at the beginning of the campaign to seventy-nine dol-
116. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 37, App. A at 
104-05 (1990) (noting voting statistics from the 1989 proxy season). 
117. Several factors may account for this increase in voting activity, including the growing insis· 
tence of regulators that ERISA fiduciaries and others maintain records of their voting behavior, and 
the emergence of a cottage industry of proxy-voting consultants. The SEC, through its oversight of 
the proxy voting process, has also stimulated more timely circulation of proxy materials to share· 
holders whose stock is held in street name. 
118. Examples of organized "revolt" among institutional investors may be found in connection 
with General Motors' redemption of Ross Perot's shares for $742 million in November 1987 and in 
connection with the Exxon Valdez incident in March 1989. In the former case, six institutions co-
sponsored a shareholder resolution protesting the buy-back and seeking amendments to the com· 
pany's bylaws. Clowes, GM Stock Up; Fight Continues, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Jan. 26, 
1987, at 1.. In the latter case, several institutions met with Exxon's management, demanding the 
appointment of an environmentalist to the company's board. Pension Power and the Big Spill, N.Y. 
Times, May 19, 1989, at A34, col. 1. 
119. Recently, CalPERS and the New York State Co=on Retirement Fund led the efforts to 
persuade General Motors to adopt a bylaw ensuring that future GM boards would be comprised of n 
majority of independent, outside directors. See infra note 235. 
120. For the history of institutional activity in 1987 and 1988, see Ryan, supra note 8, nt 158-60. 
For more current history, see infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. 
121. Honeywell: The Value of Shareholder Activism, 4 U.S.A. ADVOCATE No. 9, at 3 (Sept. 
1989) [hereinafter Honeywell]. 
122. The vote in favor of a classified board was 46.6% for and 29.5% llgainst; the vote in favor of 
the abolition of shareholder action by written consent was 43.4% for and 32.6% against. L. KRAS· 
NOW, supra note 50, at app. 79. 
HeinOnline -- 69 N.C. L. Rev.  1155 1990-1991
1991] INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 1155 
Iars per share three weeks later, when the vote tally had been completed.123 
Several weeks following the vote, the company was restructured, stimulating a 
rise in share price to eighty-nine dollars per share. The reStructuring, long re-
sisted by Honeywell's management, was attributed as much to the influence of 
institutional investors as it was to Honeywell's continuing exposure to 
takeover. 124 
In addition to organizing collective action to resist management-initiated, 
value-reducing proposals like Honeywell's, 125 there have been a number of 
shareholder-initiated, value-enhancing proposals. As noted above, 126 institu-
tional investors since 1987 have been advancing proposals concerning poison 
pills. During the 1990 proxy season, te~ institutional investors submitted thirty 
proposals that would require companies either to redeem their poison pills or to 
put them to a shareholder vote.127 Four of these proposals-at Armco, Avon 
Products, Champion International and K-Mart-received a majority of the 
votes cast.128 Institutions were also instrumental in encouraging more than sev-
enty Pennsylvania companies to opt out of the 1990 Pennsylvania antitakeover 
law that, like poison pills, imposes a substantial negative impact on share 
~~w -
Other issues have caught and sustained institutions' interest il11 the last three 
years. While confidential voting has been institutions' "major initiative,"130 
other recurring issues on which institutions have taken the lead have included 
proposals to require shareholder approval of targeted-share placements,131 pro-
posals to opt out of the Delaware antitakeover law,132 antigreenmail propos-
als, 133 and proposals to require shareholder approval of all golden parachute 
contracts.134 All of these initiatives, perhaps save the secret ba:Uot, have been 
aimed at disencumbering the market for Corporate control and facilitating unin-
vited takeovers. More generally, the goal of the proposals has been to maxj.mize 
share value or, at least, to create an atmosphere conducive to maximization. 
123. Honeywell, supra note 121. 
124. !d. 
125. Another example of institutional resistance to management proposals is the rejection in 
1990 of a proposed amen~ent to the Articles of Incorpomtion of Alleghany Corp. that would have 
disenfranchised shareholders holding as much as 15% of the company's shares. Alleghany Holders 
Defeat Plan for Takeover Defense, Wall. St. J., May 7, 1990, at B3, col. 3. 
126. See supra note 111. 
127. J. BIERSACH, supra note 50, at app. 79-97. 
128. Id. 
129. See Pamepinto, Studies Agree: Pennsylvania Law Lowers Share Value, IRRC CoRP. Gov-
ERNANCE BULL., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 6 (describing studies of investment managers at Wilshire Asso-
ciates and economists at Drexel University which show that the new law depressed collective share 
prices by $3.6 and $4.0 billion, respectively); Both Sides See Victory as Companies Opt Out or Remain 
Under Pa. Statute, 22 SEc. REG. & L. R. No. 32 (BNA), Aug. 10, 1990, at 1177; Anand, Institutions 
Get Tough With Corporate Managements, Investor's Daily, July 31, 1990. 
130. L. KRASNOW, supra note 50, at 9. 
131. PFIZER, INC., PROXY 19 (Mar. 8, 1990) (proposal by CREF). 
132. BOEING, Co., PROXY 22 (Mar. 20, 1990) (proposal of NYCERS); KIMBERLY-CLARK 
CoRP., PROXY 15 (Mar. 13, 1990) (same). 
133. J.C. PENNEY CoRP., PROXY 37 (Apr. 13, 1989) (proposal of CalSTRS). 
134. RYDER SYSTEM, INC., PROXY 24 (Mar. 28, 1990) (proposal of CalSTRS). 
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Institutional investors continue to submit governance-related shareholder 
proposals, approaching the process with increasing precision. 135 Consequently, 
more shareholder proposals passed in 1990 than in the entire history of share-
holder proposals prior to 1990.136 At least twenty shareholder proposals re-
ceived majority votes (seven of these had been submitted by institutions) and the 
average support for all major proposals ran well above the 1989leve1.137 Clearly 
the behavior of institutional investors-both the initiators like CalPERS and the 
followers who supported their actions-had in the span of four proxy-voting 
seasons changed substantially in character. Many institutions are no longer con-
tent to view themselves as mere "residual claimants," but now regard themselves 
as active contributors to the corporate governance process. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR 
One of the institution-initiated proposals characteristic of the new institu-
tional behavior was the shareholders' advisory committee proposal submitted by 
CalPERS at Avon in 1990.138 Although the proposal did not receive a majority, 
it did receive forty-five percent of the votes cast-a remarkably high figure for a 
first-time proposal-and thirty-two percent of the total shares outstanding. 139 
This Article will now address whether similar proposals, if submitted in the fu-
ture, 140 should be encouraged and whether the shareholders' advisory commit-
tee is likely to perform the function that institutional investors anticipate. 
A. Patterns of Influence 
In one model of the shareholders' advisory committee, only those share-
holders with the largest holdings (and willing to serve) would be eligible to par-
ticipate. 141 The Avon proposal142 required that five out of nine members of the 
shareholders' advisory committee be selected from the company's fifty largest 
shareholders. It is important to consider who these shareholders are likely to be. 
Appendix A identifies those institutions that would be the initial candidates to 
135. Institutional proposals fell to 98 in 1990, Fromson, supra note 4. 
136. Face the Facts, S U.S.A. ADVOCATE No. 7, at 1 (July 1990). 
137. O'Hara, Both Shareholders, Management Rack Up Proxy Wins, IRRC CoRP, GOVERN· 
ANCE BULL., July-Aug. 1990, at 90; O'Hara, Shareholders Score Unprecedented Victories in 1990, 
IRRC CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL., May-June 1990, at 54. 
138. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
139. Telephone conversation with Marilyn Reynolds, Avon Products Corp. Shareholder Rela-
tions Office (Sept. 18, 1990). The vote was 19,071,650 shares FOR the proposal; 22,983,085 shares 
AGAINST the proposal and 17,086,854 shares ABSTAINING. The abstentions are believed to be 
comprised primarily of institutional investors who were not ready to commit on the issue that year. 
140. CalPERS again proposed shareholders' advisory committees during the 1991 proxy season, 
at Avon once again, and at Sears, Roebuck & Co. Parker, Looking Over the Shoulder-Sears, Al•on 
the Targets of Fund's Governance Efforts, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Nov. 26, 1990, at 3. The 
Sears proposal was later withdrawn and a modified version of the Avon proposal ultimately was 
accepted by management. Parker, GM Bylaw Revision Hailed as a Victory, PENSIONS & INVEST· 
MENTS, Feb. 4, 1991, at 6; Star, Avon, Shareholders Agree, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Apr. 1, 1991, 
at 3. CalPERS has also undertaken to persuade 30 public companies to create shareholders' advi-
sory committees voluntarily. 
141. See the "Texaco proposal," supra note 63. 
142. See supra note 4. 
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serve on the advisory committees of those companies comprising the "Top 50" 
of the 1990 Fortune 500. 
This listing of the ten largest equity holders in the Top 50 companies sug-
gests a number of patterns which in tum raise a number of possible concerns 
specifically regarding advisory committees and more generally regarding institu-
tional involvement in corporate governance: (1) what significance, if any, at-
taches to the fact that so many of the institutions are commercial banks; (2) 
what is to be made of the fact that some of these commercial banks hypotheti-
cally could serve on a large number of committees across a wide range of eco-
nomic sectors; (3) what significance, if any, attaches to the fact that many 
institutional investors, including but not limited to commercial banks, might sit 
on multiple advisory committees, including the advisory committees of competi-
tive companies or companies in vertical trade relationships with one another; (4) 
should one be concerned that many of the institutions eligible to sit on advisory 
committees may themselves be competitors of other eligible institutions; and (5) 
what, if anything, is the appropriate role in managerial oversight for Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans? 
1. The Revival of Bank Domination 
Early twentieth-century capitalism was characterized by a h;mdful of pow-
erful banks that largely were able to determine how and where capital would be 
employed throughout the American economy. 143 The largest of these banks, of 
course, was the House of Morgan, whose partners held seats, at the time of 
Morgan's greatest strength, on the boards of 112 public companies.144 
Apprehension about bank domination of corporate decisionmaking has sur-
faced with some regularity since the House of Morgan days. For example, in 
1938 New Deal policymakers assembled the Temporary National Economic 
Committee (TNEC), which examined the effects of bank control over national 
corporations as part of a larger study on the causes of the Great Depression. In 
1968, Congressman Wright Patman, chairman of the House Banking Commit-
tee, expressed concern that "the American economy of today is in the greatest 
danger of being dominated by a handful of corporations in a single industry as it 
has been since the great money trusts of the early 1900s,"145 and commissioned 
a comprehensive study of commercial bank trust departments and the way in 
which they used their influence. 146 
In his 1978 book, Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United States, 
143. M. MIZRUCHI, THE AMERICAN CORPORATE NETWORK, 1904-1974, at 25 (1982). 
144. R. CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN-AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE 
RisE OF MODERN FINANCE 152 (1990). "In this era of relationship banking, board seats often meant 
a monopoly on a company's business. During the previous decade, the House of Morgan had floated 
almost $2 billion in securities-an astronomical figure for the time." Id. Morgan's influence and 
that of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. on the American economy were the focus of the 1912 hearings of the 
"Pujo Committee," a congressional committee headed by Rep. Arsene Pujo (D-La.). I d. at 150-56. 
145. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE COMM. ON BANKING AND CUR-
RENCY, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THEIR TRUST ACTIVITIES: EMERGING 
INFLUENCE ON THE AMERICAN EcONOMY iii (Comm. Print 1968). 
146. Id. 
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David Kotz reexamined Congressman Patman's data and argued that since the 
1960s, public companies had come increasingly under the control of American 
money center banks.147 Kotz asserted that this trend portended several poten-
tially adverse consequences, including a tendency to take on excessive debt, a 
reduction of intra-industry competition, less-than-optimal pricing policies vis-a-
vis bank-controlled suppliers and customers, and a tendency toward conglomer-
atization.148 Kotz also argued that bank-controlled companies are more risk-
averse than comparable non-bank-controlled companies, due to the banks' con-
flicting roles as both equity- and debt-holder.149 
Some sociologists have rejected Kotz's findings, arguing that the so-called 
"control" of corporations by banks--especially insofar as that "control" is evi-
denced by bank presence on corporate boards-is in fact something quite differ-
ent. Under these theories, corporate managers invite bankers to sit on their 
boards in order to co-opt them, not as a signal of capitulation to their power. 150 
Others have pointed out that so-called bank-controlled corporations generally 
pay higher dividends than those that are not bank-controlled, so that bank con-
trol, if it exists, in fact may be beneficial to shareholders.151 
This debate has value with regard to the question whether bank participa-
tion-even multiple bank participation-on shareholders' advisory committees 
poses any risk to shareholder interests. Many corporations already have bank 
representatives on their boards.152 Even assuming this presence is infiltrative on 
the part of the banks, rather than deliberately co-optive on management's part, 
these banker/directors seldom have much, if any, direct impact on corporate 
operating policies.153 Given the way in which upper level management struc-
tures corporate boards and controls their agendas, individual directors have very 
little opportunity to influence a corporation's day-to-day operations or decisions 
about borrowing, pricing, or strategic planning.154 By contrast, the CEO has 
enormous power.155 
This is not to say that CEOs do not nurture important banking relation-
147. D. KOTZ, BANK CoNTROL OF LARGE CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1978). 
148. Id. at 130-40. 
149. Id. at 141-44. Note that banks themselves cannot own common stock, although bank hold· 
ings companies may. Bank equity holdings are maintained solely in a fiduciary capacity through 
bank trust departments. 
150. See Caswell, An Institutional Perspective on Corporate Control and the Network of Interlock· 
ing Directorates, XVIII J. EcoN. IssUES 619, 622-24 (1984); Palmer, Broken Ties: Interlocking Di· 
rectorates and Intercorporate Coordination, 28 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 40, 45-46 (1983) (describing the 
competing theories); Richardson, Directorship Interlocks and Corporate Prafttabllity, 32 ADMIN. Sci. 
Q. 367, 368-71 (1987). 
151. Kerbo & Della Fave, Corporate Linkage and Control of the Corporate Economy: New Evi· 
dence and a Reinterpretation, 24 Soc. Q. 201, 210 (1983). 
152. This practice is declining, however. According to Kom/Ferry International, 54.1% of 
companies responding to its annual survey in 1974 reported having a commercial banker on their 
boards. In 1990, only 23% of those responding reported a commercial banker on their boards. 
Yovovich, More Than Ever. CEOs Lean on Directors, CRAIN's CHICAGO Bus., Oct. 8, 1990, at 18. 
153. Sociologists refer to this view as "the null hypothesis." Caswell, supra note 150, at 622. 
154. See J. LoRSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES-THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE 
BOARDS 75-96 (1989). 
155. Id. 
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ships; they do, especially in times of tight money. They are, however, unlikely to 
do so in ways that disregard competitive alternatives over time. Moroover, most 
public companies today enjoy multiple banking relationships1S6 and have avail-
able to them many non-bank sources of capital, 157 thus reducing their depen-
dence on banks whose representatives may sit on their boards. 
Just as fears of bank control cannot be supported solely on the basis of bank 
presence on corporate boards, the same fears should not be premised on the 
power of a bank's shareholder vote held in trust.158 While that vote may have 
great value in contested control settings, it has scant influence otherwise. Bor-
rowing and pricing issues, for example, are excluded expressly from those issues 
that may be considered by shareholders at the annual shareholders' meeting.159 
Moreover, banks holding shares in trust are supposed to cast th•~ir votes in a 
fiduciary capacity, and to observe a "Chinese wall" between trust and lending 
functions. 160 ' 
If bank domination of business exists, it is most likely because of the risk-
reducing terms of specific banks' commercial lending agreements, not because of 
any status based on ownership. Thus, the creation of shareholders' advisory 
committees in which banks may play a prominent role would be unlikely to 
increase any single bank's influence significantly beyond that which it already 
has. Moreover, because of the hazards of emerging doctrines of lender liabil-
ity,161 most banks are seeking to have less, rather than more, direct impact on 
corporate governance. Thus, even recognizing their special fiduciary status, 
banks might eschew an advisory committee role. 
Assume, however, that commercial banks agree to serve on shareholders' 
advisory committees in the approximate order of their eligibility, and thus, in 
combination, enjoy substantial influence. The real risk of bank domination in 
corporate governance is that banks often have shown themselv·~ to be poor 
value producers.162 That is, if the end result of any movement toward share-
holder advisory committees is to make non-financial companies perform more 
like their bank owners, then shareholders could be the losers. That outcome, 
however, is unlikely for three reasons: (1) it would be the rare advisory commit-
tee that would be comprised of a majority of bank representatives; (2) the pres-
ence of competitive bank representatives on any ~ven committee would 
minimize favoritism toward any one of them; and (3) even_ if banks collectively 
156. Luke, Rivalry Intensifies in California Market, AM. BANKER, June 15, 1988, at 23 (average 
number of banking relationships is 3.1 nationally). 
157. The private placement market, for example, made up almost entirely of debt placed with 
insurance companies, increased from $59 billion in 1985 to $168 billion in 1989. Jereski, !fin Doubt. 
Downgrade It!, FORBES, Jan. 7, 1991, at 52. 
158. Banks as trustee currently hold legal title to approximately 15.3% of all corporate stock. 
W. CARY &M. EISENBERG, supra note 36, at 144. 
159. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1990). 
160. B. KRIKORIAN, FIDUCIARY STANDARDS IN PENSION AND TRUST FuND MANAGEMENT 
242-46 (1989). 
161. See supra note 44. , 
162. See Byron, The Bad-News Banks, NEW YORK, Oct. 8, 1990, at 16 (describing recent bank 
stock decline); Webennan, Bank Debt Play, FoRBES, Sept. 17, 1990, at 235 (same); Weiss, Bottom-
Fishers Are Eyeing the Banks, Bus. WK., Nov. 12, 1990, at 119 (same). 
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played a dominant role in an advisory committee, any industry-wide bias would 
be mitigated by the other members of the committee and by non-bank members 
of the board. 
Finally, a word must be said about concerns that banks, as well as other 
institutions-because of their substantial multiple holdings-might sit simulta-
neously on a number of advisory committees, including those of competitive 
enterprises and those of companies in vertical trade relationships. One might 
fairly ask if the resultant interlocks among these companies might impair the 
corporate performance of any or all of them. The initial response to this concern 
is that this kind of impairment is unlikely to occur because shareholders' advi-
sory committees only rarely would be established and then, only for the most 
poorly performing companies. No one envisions hundreds, or even dozens of 
such committees ever existing simultaneously.163 Nonetheless, because the pos-
sibility of interlock does, at least theoretically, exist, it merits separate 
consideration. 
2. The Problem of Advisory Interlock 
The sociological literature is profuse with studies of interlocking corporate 
directorates and their alleged pernicious influence both on corporate perform-
ance and larger issues of societal concern.164 For some, interlocking director-
ates165 stimulate ominous conspiracy theorizing: 
[A]mong the largest national corporations (and for that matter among 
the largest companies within a region), personal interlocks between 
business leaders may lead to a concentration of economic or fiscal con-
trol in a few hands. There is in this the danger of a business elite, an 
ingrown group, impervious to outside forces, intolerant of dissent, and 
protective of the status quo, charting the direction of [industry]. 166 
163. Telephone conversation with Nell Minow, President, Institutional Shareholders Services, 
Inc. (Dec. 31, 1990). 
164. See, e.g., R. BURT, CoRPORATE PROFITS AND COOPTATION-NETWORKS OF MARKET 
CoNSTRAINTS AND DIRECTORATE TIES IN THE AMERICAN EcONOMY (1983); M. MIZRUCHI, supra 
note 143; J. PENNINGS, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES-ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CON• 
NECTIONS AMONG ORGANIZATIONS' BOARDS OF DIRECTORS (1980). 
165. Scholars recognize two types of interlocks among companies. "Direct interlocks" occur 
when a single director sits on the board of two or more companies. In these cases, the "receiving" 
companies are said to be interlocked. Direct interlocks between competitors, as when X sits on the 
boards of both Ford and Chrysler, are prohibited by section 8 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 19 
(West Supp. 1990). "Indirect interlocks" occur when two companies each have a director on the 
board of a third. In these cases, the "sending" companies are said to be interlocked. 
166. SENATE CoMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, SUBCOMM. ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING 
AND MANAGEMENT, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES AMONG THE MAJOR U.S. CORPORATIONS, S. 
Doc. No. 107, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). This report also articulates some of the specific abuses 
which interlocking directorates supposedly invite: 
Second, interlocks between actual or potential competitors, whether direct or indirect, 
provide a linkage for communication and discussion which can result in common action 
(with or without agreement) and a consequent elimination of competition. , , • 
Third, there may be directorate interconnections between companies, which, although 
not directly competitive, are in the same or closely related industries. Such liaison relation· 
ships may result in corporate policies which discourage expansion and diversification into 
competitive areas, or the development of completely new business fields .••• 
Fourth, vertical interlocks-where a common director links two or more companies 
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For others, the existence of widespread interlocking directorates promotes 
efficiency by encouraging uniform practices or coordinating distribution. Inter-
locks may also reduce the costs of doing business, for example by facilitating the 
transmission of information from a corporation's suppliers or customers. All of 
these theories, like those concerned with "bank domination," are premised on an 
inflated view of the director's role at the center of the interlock.167 
Directors generally act according to a number of unstated but understood 
and shared behavioral norms.168 Today these norms prohibit directors from 
conferring with one another outside of board or board committee meetings, 169 
and from initiating discussions with upper or middle managers without specific 
direction from the CEO. Directors, themselves busy men and women, occasion-
ally meet with these managers in structured settings in connection with sched-
uled board meetings, 170 but rarely have occasion to converse with them 
otherwise. 
Board meetings do not afford much opportunity for the sorts of informal 
exchange that would facilitate the transmission of "inside" information from 
director to director or from director to in-house manager. At such meetings, 
according to Bayless Manning (who has attended many of them), 
[f]ully three quarters of the board's time will be devoted to reports by 
the management and board committees, routine housekeeping resolu-
tions passed unanimously with little or no discussion, and information 
responding to specific questions that had earlier been put to the man-
agement by directors about a wide range of topics sometimes accompa-
nied by suggestions from the board members, usually procedural in 
character. Perhaps the remaining one quarter of the meeting time will 
be addressed to a decision, typically unanimous, on one or two specific 
different business items, such as the sale of a subsidiary or the estab-
lishment of a compensation plan.171 
having actual or potential dealings with each other at different levels of business activity-
are also potentially dangerous. Such interlocks can reach backward to various states of 
supply or forward through various levels of distribution and consumption. In either case, 
the close relationship may lead to preferential treatment to the detriment of other suppliers 
or consumers. 
Id. at 6-7. Louis Brandeis described concerns about interlocking directorates in a 1915 speech: 
[Interlocking directorates] are an obstacle to knowledge offundamental facts, because 
the existence of the interlocking robs an enterprise of those conditions which under the 
general laws of business ordinarily lead to the ascertainment of true values. Ordinarily in 
business the value of a thing or service is determined through the agreement reached by an 
intelligent seller and an intelligent purchaser-each looking out for his own interest to the 
best of his ability. Where interlocking directorates or other conflicting interests exist, this 
protection is lost. 
L. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 323 (1933). 
167. Others have argued in a similar vein. SeeM. MIZRUCHI, supra note 143, at 35 (citing J. 
GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 
(1971); G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (1968)). 
168. J. LoRSCH, supra note 154, at 91-95. 
169. Id. at 93. 
170. Id. at 60. 
171. Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Real-
ity, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1483 (1984). Elmer Johnson, a former member of the General Motors 
board, has noted that often board meetings are little more than "slide shows or theatricals carefully 
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The meetings themselves last only three to six hours.I72 In short, and 
notwithstanding the quite compelling logic of social network theories, contem-
porary board members seldom get the chance to influence operating decisions 
which could, over time, be harmful to shareholder interests.I73 Thus, if share-
holders' advisory committees are otherwise a sound idea, concerns that they 
may replicate and even exacerbate existing interlocks at the directoral level 
should not present a serious impediment to their adoption.I74 
3. Threats to Institutional Competitiveness 
Consider a "typical" shareholders' advisory committee comprised of ten 
members-three banks, four mutual fund management companies, two public 
pension funds, and CREF. One could imagine that such proximity might lead 
to diminished intra-industry competition among the committee members them-
selves. Like concerns about bank domination or the consequences of advisory 
interlocks, this is a baseless concern. Public pension funds (and corporate pen-
sion funds) are not in competition with one another for beneficiaries, and the 
mutual funds or banks which might participate on advisory committees are al-
ready members of trade associations, where anticompetitive conduct-if it is to 
occur-is more likely to occur than in the context of collective efforts to improve 
a portfolio company's performance. 
4. The Role of Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
Over ten thousand companies now offer some type of Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan (ESOP)I75 by which corporate employees may acquire equity 
ownership in their employer. Some two thousand public companies have ES-
OPs. Most of these plans hold less than fifteen percent of the sponsoring com-
pany's equity.I76 
ESOPs typically are managed by plan trustees who are selected and com-
pensated by management. Many public companies' plans, however, confer 
"pass-through" voting rights, enabling participating workers to vote on 
scripted by the chairman." Johnson, An Insider's Call for Outside Direction, HARV. Bus. REv., 
Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 47. 
172. J. LoRSCH, supra note 154, at 87. 
173. In one view, board service can be seen not as cementing a relationship between specific 
firms, "but as a diffuse set of social relations that facilitates formation of group consensus and social· 
izes new members of the [upper] class." Caswell, supra note 150, at 622-23. 
174. The possibility of Clayton Act-type interlocks at the advisory level may present a different, 
and larger, problem. Occasions conceivably could arise in which an institutional investor would be 
eligible and would like to place a representative on the advisory committees of, say, both Ford and 
Chrysler. Institutions could minimize, but not eliminate, this problem by placing a different repre-
sentative on each committee. They could eliminate the problem voluntarily by disqualifying them-
selves from one of the committees or, more broadly, by excluding from eligibility for committee 
membership any shareholder who is represented on the board or an advisory committee of a compet-
itive enterprise. 
175. Hansmann, When Does. Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermlnation, 
and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L. J. 1749, 1752 (1990). 
176. M. QUARREY, J. BLASI & C. ROSEN, TAKING STOCK-EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AT WORK 
viii (1986). 
HeinOnline -- 69 N.C. L. Rev.  1163 1990-1991
1991] INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 1163 
directoral candidates and other issues submitted for shareholder vote. 177 
Studies generally have shown that the presence of an ESOP has no positive 
impact on firm productivity or profitability;178 indeed, some studies have shown 
that ESOPs often have a negative impact on share value. 179 At best the evidence 
is inconclusive.180 Any correlation between ESOP ownership and corporate 
performance that could be proven, however, likely would derive from enhanced 
management-labor relations arising out of the creation of the ESOP and not 
from any special expertise on the part of worker/owners in their capacity as 
shareholder/voters. Moreover, studies have shown that ESOF' participants 
overwhelmingly favor management when voting, even where that vote may be 
adverse to their ownership interests.181 For example, during the 1980s many 
companies strategically established ESOPs as a tool to thwart uninvited take-
overs.182 In recent proxy contests at these companies, employees' pass-through 
votes largely have been cast in favor of incumbent management and against in-
surgent board candidates.183 Thus, there is little reason to believe that the pres-
ence of an ESOP representative on a shareholders' advisory committee would 
make an appreciable difference in a company's governance choices, particularly 
if the assigned ESOP representative is the management-controlled ESOP trustee. 
For this reason, advocates of shareholders' advisory committees by definition 
might exclude corporate ESOPs, even where their holdings otherwise would 
render them eligible to serve.Is4 
B. Institutional Skills and Value Preferences 
Some commentators have suggested that an increased institutional role in 
corporate governance would result in impaired financial performance directly 
attributable to institutional values and skills. For example, in a recent commen-
tary, Boston College business professors Samuel Graves and Sandra Waddock 
argue that institutional investors involved in the active oversight of a number of 
enterprises would be "forced to use simple, quantifiable, and perhaps naive, per-
formance measures" to keep track of them:185 
177. Hansmann, supra note 175, at 1797-99. 
178. See J. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP-REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF'? (1988). 
179. One study suggests that establishment of the ESOP itself may depress share value as much 
as 4.5%. ESOPs' Impact Studied: Plans Seen Insulating Management/rom Takeovers, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENT AGE, July 10, 1989, at 33. . 
180. See C. ROSEN, K. KLEIN & K. YOUNG, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP lN A."\fERlCA 2 (1986). 
181. See J. BLASI, supra note 178, at 166. 
182. See, e.g., Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. 1989) (upholding 
defensive creation of an ESOP holding 14% of the target's equity). 
183. In the 1990 proxy fight at Lockheed Corp., approximately 70% of the participating em-
ployee/shareholders voted their pass-through shares with more than 90% of the shares cast in favor 
of incumbent management. Stroud, Lockheed Wins Proxy Fight, But At a Cost, Investor's Daily, 
Apr. 11, 1990, at I. But see Ring, ESOP Fiduciaries Target of Suit, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, 
May 28, 1990, at 26 (70% of ESOP shares at South Bend Lathe, Inc. were voted against the re-
election of three members of the incumbent board). 
184. Cf. the "Avon proposal," supra note 4 (eligibility for membership on Advisory Committee 
required beneficial ownership of company's voting stock as sole affiliation with the company). 
185. Graves & Waddock, Ownership at a Distance: Implications of Activist Institutional Inves-
tors, Bus. IN THE CoNTEMP. WORLD, Spring 1990, at 86. 
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These measures may fail to account for the subtleties and ambigu-
ities which actually exist at the operating level. . . . This kind of man-
agement may dampen innovation by "relying too heavily on short-
term financial measures-a sort of managerial remote control .... " 186 
Drawing the analogy to classic corporate conglomerates, in which deci-
sionmakers lacked operating knowledge and were "structurally distant" from 
the people actually responsible for, and knowledgeable about, production, 
design, and marketing, Graves and Waddock suggest that "very large scale 
institutional holdings accompanied by active institutional participation in corpo-
rate governance [may] yield the same [poor] results as traditional 
conglomeration." 187 
These concerns appear to confuse the "hands on" managerial role of con-
glomerateurs with the "advisory" role of institutional investors who, by defini-
tion, would be two steps removed from any "hands on" position. It may be true 
that conglomerates failed because key decisionmakers lacked sufficient knowl-
edge concerning diverse divisions' strengths and needs to generate an appropri-
ate operational plan. But directors, and certainly outside directors, are 
understood not to have intimate knowledge of corporate affairs. 188 There is no 
reason to expect that institutional investors serving as advisors to the board 
would have any greater access to information than do outside directors, nor that 
their lack of information would impair corporate performance. 
Nonetheless, there is a legitimate concern that advisors (like the directors 
they advise) may judge corporate performance by artificial methods suited to 
their particular skills and applicable to all corporations, rather than by measures 
tailored to an individual corporation's characteristics. For example, a number 
of institutions and their consultants currently are working on computerized pro-
grams whose purpose is to identify "weak" corporations. 189 Because they are 
designed to be applied market-wide, and are unlikely to accommodate idiosyn-
cracies, these programs may tend to encourage formulaic solutions to complex 
corporate problems. Using such approaches, institutional advisors may rigidify, 
rather than improve, a corporation's governance plan. 
Other concerns may be raised about institutions' value preferences. For 
example, conflicts of interest may influence governance priorities: Will the State 
of Wisconsin Investment Board work to stem plant closures in that state?19° 
Will retail mutual funds, concerned about their own quarterly results and their 
/d. 
186. /d. 
187. /d. 
188. See J. LoRSCH, supra note 154, at 80-81. Lorsch states: 
In the boardroom, the CEO is the acknowledged expert. Outside directors are part-timers, 
while the CEO not only spends most of the time leading the company, he or she has usually 
been involved with it for his or her whole career. . . . [O]utside directors are keenly aware 
of the limitations of their own information and understanding. 
189. See, e.g., Terhaar, PERS Devises New Rating System, Sacramento Bee, Apr. 3, 1990, at F1 
(describing system developed by Analysis Group, Inc., which permits intra-industry comparisons 
among companies. Such factors as short- and long-term stock returns, five-year return on assets, 
operating margins, asset turnover, and cash flow/asset ratios will be included in the system). 
190. See supra note 39. 
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position in mutual fund performance rankings, encourage the manipulation of 
corporate financial activities to impact on short term share pricing? Will risk-
averse banks encourage corporate behavior conducive to reliable loan repay-
ment? "Such pressure could result in abandonment of products or services re-
quiring significant risk-taking."191 Some observers have expressed concern that 
institutional investors will focus on self-serving and "winnable" reforms, such as 
confidential voting, rather than addressing more significant performance-related 
issues.192 
All of these concerns are legitimate, but probably not significant. For ex-
ample, the conflicts of interest of individual advisors can be diffused by the di-
versity of the advisory committee. Thus, regional biases can be offset by non-
regional biases and short-term preferences by long-term preferences. Risk takers 
can balance the risk avoiders. The "shareholders' rights" zealots aie likely to be 
outnumbered where they cannot show that their agenda has a demonstrable im-
pact on value. 
C. Institutional Expertise 
Perhaps the greatest concern about the changing role of institutional inves-
tors is whether institutions have the competence necessary to play an effective 
governance role. In a recent Harvard Business Review article, Vllilliam Taylor 
points out that most public pension fund trustees are either politicians or public 
employees, not trained business managers.193 Similarly, corporate pension fund 
trustees, union pension fund trustees, and mutual fund executives are seldom 
themselves experts in corporate strategic planning. Their hired money managers 
may be "experts in when to buy and sell stocks, bonds and options [but they are] 
not [experts] in how to reinvigorate a global industrial empire like GM."194 
Taylor concedes that this deficiency can be compensated for by hiring 
agents with appropriate expertise.195 One may fairly ask, however, whether 
agents selected by institutional investors to represent their interests on a share-
holders' advisory committee are likely to be any more capable than outside di-
rectors selected by incumbent management or by a nominating committee for a 
position on the corporate board.196 Even if these agents are "accountable" to 
their nominators more than to incumbent management, they still will face 
problems relating to lack of time, staff and resources. Moreover, the universe of 
191. Graves & Waddock, supra note 185, at 87. 
192. Taylor, supra note 28, at 78 ("A company with an eroding position in world markets does 
not improve its position by eliminating a poison pill or by adopting confidential voting."). 
193. Id. at 72-74. 
194. /d. at 74. See also DeMott, Assessing Investors' Long-Term Commitment, LEGAL TIMES, 
Apr. 24, 1989, at 27 ("Unfortunately, the skills and perspectives necessary to manage an investment 
portfolio •.. may not match the skills and perspectives required to run other types of businesses."). 
195. Hundreds of companies already have engaged in strategic restructuring, with the result that 
many corporate executives are now high on the knowledge curve of mechanisms that can create 
shareholder value. See Rappaport, The Staying Power of the Public Corporation, HARv. Bus. REv., 
Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 96-100. 
196. Many observers have asserted that even the best qualified directors are likely to be ineffec-
tive monitors, given the "tools placed at their disposal [and] the process by which they are nomi-
nated." Levmore, supra note 92, at 62. 
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available candidates for these positions is limited, even if one considers not only 
experienced chief executive officers (the typical candidate field), but also aca-
demics, lawyers, and financial experts.197 
Public companies already are experiencing difficulty keeping competent 
men and women on their corporate boards.198 How will institutions find candi-
dates to represent them on advisory committees (a position of less prestige and 
direct influence than membership on the board itself) when corporate managers 
are finding it difficult to fill board vacancies?199 Any desirable candidate for an 
advisory committee position is likely to be pursued for board positions as well. 
In light of the likely differential in compensation for the two positions, few with 
a choice would choose the advisory role. Consequently, those willing to accept 
advisory committee positions are likely to be less competent than those whose 
directoral performance they would be expected to review. 
D. The Advisory Committee's Agenda 
The question of competence ultimately must turn on what, precisely, share-
holders' advisory committees would be expected to do that is not already being 
done by the traditional board of directors. Some proponents of shareholders' 
advisory committees suggest that the committees' agendas should include only a 
few items: executive compensation and the occasional issue that pits manage-
ment against shareholders, such as the adoption of antitakeover devices or major 
changes in strategic direction. 200 Other institutional activists favor a broader 
agenda, which would include the entire panoply of issues traditionally allocated 
to the corporate board. Apart from specifics, shareholders' advisory committees 
could serve four possible functions: (1) initiation, (2) consultation, (3) monitor-
ing, and (4) communication. 
No one envisions that shareholders' advisory committees would initiate cor-
porate strategic plans. Boards do not do so now, and for very good reasons-
they have neither the necessary access to detailed operating information nor a 
staff to develop such plans. Advisory committee members would be one step 
further removed from information and similarly unsupported by a professional 
staff. Moreover, advisory committee members presumably would spend less 
time per company on governance matters than do board members because advi-
sors, unlike directors, will not, under current law, risk legal liability for failure to 
exercise due care. 
197. J. LoRSCH, supra note 154, at 19 (currently there "aren't enough CEOs to go around"-ns 
many as 60% of CEOs invited to join a corporate board now decline). 
198. KoRN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 22, at 11 (twenty-five percent of corporate re-
spondents reported the resignation of outside directors within the past year, with the highest inci-
dence of resignations occurring in the retail and banking sectors). 
199. /d. at 12. ''Twenty-five percent of the responding companies reported that prospective 
board directors declined invitations to serve on their boards in the past year, up from 23 percent in 
1988 and 20 percent in 1985. Of the total respondents, 62 percent experienced one refusal, 32 per-
cent had two, and six percent reported three or more. At 29 percent, billion dollar corporations and 
insurance firms most frequently experienced refusals." /d. 
200. Dobrzynski, A Shareholder's Place is in the Boardroom-Sometimes, Bus. WK., Jan. 22, 
1990, at 30 (quoting Nell Minow, then General Counsel of Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.) 
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It is more reasonable to expect that advisory committees would provide a 
consultative function-reviewing proposals in their formative stages and mas-
saging those proposals to achieve consensus with the directors. This model, 
however, presents an obvious risk of inefficiency. The typical corporate board 
already must consider the views and prejudices of ten to eighteen board mem-
bers.201 Adding an additional nine or ten advisors inevitably would retard the 
decisionmaking process, with no assurance that the decisions reached would be 
any better in terms of shareholder wealth than had no advisors been consulted. 
This phenomenon would be most apparent if advisory committees become popu-
lated largely by director-clones, or if the committees adopt a combative ap-
proach to their advisory tasks. 
Advisory committees also might be expected to monitor management-
both in the specific sense of tracking performance against pre-established per-
formance criteria, and in the more general sense of ensuririg against managerial 
shirking and disloyalty. Again, this would invite duplication of the efforts of the 
traditional board and its various committees. Moreover, if one assumes that the 
board has immediate access to sources of information while the committee 
would receive only that information that has been filtered through the board, the 
advisory committee's monitoring would be at best derivative, and in any case 
less efficient than the monitoring conducted by the board. 
The least that can be expected of shareholders' advisory committees is that 
they would become transmitters of information to and from the board and the 
committees' institutional constituents. This role can be likened to that of the 
indenture trustee, who performs a "passive and essentially ministerial role."202 
Although this role would be harmless, it would not be costless, and therefore 
only could be justified if the communication provided were appreciably more 
valuable to big shareholders than that already provided through existing share-
holder relations channels. 
The question whether under any of these scenarios shareholders would be 
"better off" with an advisory committee than they would be under the status 
quo remains problematical. Even if advisory committees were limited to the 
critical issue of executive compensation, there is no assurance that committee 
views of an appropriate incentive formula would lead to better corporate per-
formance than now exists. 
E. Costs and Compensation 
Whatever the precise charge of the shareholders' advisory committee, its 
existence necessarily would involve costs to the corporation, if no more than 
committee members' "actual expenses."203 Of more interest are the additional 
costs, represented by committee members' time, which must be borne, one as-
sumes, either by the members themselves or by the institutions whose interests 
201. KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 22, at 14. 
202. Comment, The Washington Public Power Supply System Bond Default: Expanding the Pre-
ventive Role of the Indenture Trustee, 34 EMORY L.J. 157, 161, 198 (1985). 
203. See the "Avon proposal," supra note 4. 
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they represent. If a committee member is a salaried employee of the institution 
she represents, compensation will be handled as part of the institution's over-
head. But if, as is more likely, institutional investors engage experts, those ex-
perts will demand to be paid. This fact effectively will exclude many 
institutional investors who canriot or will not bear the costs of representation. 
In turn, this may serve to minimize the diversity of the advisory committee, 
supposedly one of the idea's strengths.204 It also will create free rider problems. 
IV. THE VALUE OF INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM 
The foregoing discussion suggests that, even though many of the critics' 
concerns about shareholders' advisory committees may be misplaced, there are 
several reasons why shareholders' advisory committees are an inadvisable solu-
tion to institutions' desires to participate more effectively in corporate govern-
ance: committees are likely to lack expertise, they are likely to duplicate the 
efforts of incumbent outside directors, and they are unlikely to perform well any 
unique function which would warrant the costs involved. 
There may be other reasons why creation of shareholders' advisory com-
mittees may be an unwise response to poor corporate performance. Acquiring a 
stake in governance by participation in advisory committees may stimulate insti-
tutions to prefer equity investments when their capital might better be allocated 
to other types of investments. And, curiously, establishing a shareholders' advi-
sory committee might serve to strengthen management's control rather than to 
diffuse it. That is, investors who participate in shareholders' advisory commit-
tees may, by the process of co-optation,205 become less capable of monitoring 
management than they would be as pure outsiders. 
Most important, reliance on a shareholders' advisory committee draws at-
tention away from the proper locus of managerial oversight-the board of direc-
tors itself. After all, it is the board, not the shareholders, that is charged with 
making the corporation perform.206 Rather than creating a "shadow cabinet,'' 
comprised of shareholders or their representatives, that is supposed to monitor 
the board and stimulate it to more effective decisionmaking, institutions can 
achieve the same result, with greater effect and at less cost, by putting institu-
tional representatives on the board itself. Board representation for institutional 
investors may be achieved either by setting aside board positions, as Professor 
Lowenstein has suggested,2°7 or by permitting institutions direct access to the 
ballot to compete for available board positions, as I, and others, have advocated 
elsewhere.208 One commentator has even advanced the unlikely proposal that 
204. In a recent survey of institutional investors, 53% of the respondents indicated that they 
would not consider participating in a shareholders' advisory committee, even if such things existed. 
J. BIERSACH, supra note 50, at 9. This compares to 41% who oppose the creation of shareholders' 
advisory committees. /d. at 54. 
205. See Dent, supra note 100, at 909 (describing the co-optation process as it applies to outside 
directors on corporate boards). 
206. See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. Acr § 8.01 (1984). 
207. L. LoWENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 209-10. 
208. Barnard, supra note 116, at 98 and commentators cited therein at 54-61. 
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corporations cede the entire process of board selection to institutional 
investors. 209 
I do not discount, nor do I discuss here, the many existing impediments, 
and perceived impediments, to placing institutional investors or their representa-
tives on a corporate board.210 The critical question in this context is how chang-
ing the composition of a corporation's board of directors to include institutional 
investors or their representatives might make a corporation stronger. Many 
studies have suggested that the presence of "independent" directors on a board 
makes little difference in the way the board functions and has no positive impact 
on the company's performance.211 Professors Gilson and Kraakman argue that 
only "professional outside directors," serving full time as corporate vigilantes, 
have any hope of breathing new life into the traditional corporate board.212 
Their scheme involves the creation of a tripartite board, composed of "inside 
directors," "outside directors" selected by management, and "professional direc-
tors"-primarily academics and consultants-nominated by institutions and 
elected in groups sufficient to command a substantial board voice.213 
Merely changing board composition to decrease the percentage of corporate 
CEOs,214 or to include directors whose nomination originated outside of the 
executive suite, is not enough, although it is a necessary precondition to effective 
governance reform. In advocating institutional participation on corporate 
boards, one must also address the way in which boards currently operate. 
Specifically, at the same time institutions seek representation on corporate 
boards through the direct nomination process, they should also advocate a rigor-
ous review of traditional board practices. Studies of organizational behavior and 
recent findings concerning the conditions that lead to the "best" group decisions 
should guide these efforts. Those conditions include: non-directive leader-
209. Dent, supra note 100, at 907-08. 
210. For a discussion of some of these problems, see Black, supra note 45, at 530-60; Conard, 
Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 MICH. J. L. REFORM 117, 152-62 (1988); Gilson & 
Kraakman, supra note 101. 
211. See, e.g.; Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 
HARv. L. REv. 597, 611-13 (1982) (independent directors do not monitor effectively because they 
share cultural values with management, lack resources, and lack adequate incentives to perform this 
task); Conard, supra note 210, at 129 ("Independent" directors are not really independent-
"[e]xecutives can easily find directors who are neither subordinates, relatives, nor suppliers, who will 
support almost anything that the executives propose, and who will resign in extreme cases rather 
than oppose the executives who have invited them to the board."); Solomon, Restructuring the Cor-
porate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise, 16 MICH. L. REv. 581, 600 (1978) (empirical 
review of performance of corporate boards after a court-ordered change in composition indicates 
"imperceptible" change in directors' behavior or approach to governance). But see Baysinger & 
Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board 
Composition, 1 J. L., EcoN. & ORG. 101, 104 (1985) (finding that "board composition, in terms of 
the proportion of outside independent directors, has a mild [positive] effect on organizational per-
formance, but that the effect is lagged."); Kesner & Johnson, An Investigation of the Relationship 
Between Board Composition and Stockholder Suits, 11 STRATEGic MGMT. J. 327, 333 (1990) (boards 
sued for breach of fiduciary duties tend to have a greater percentage of insiders than those not sued). 
212. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 101. 
213. Id. 
214. Sixty three percent of public company board members are themselves chief executives of 
other public companies. "These directors are unlikely to monitor more energetically than they be-
lieve they should be monitored by their own boards." /d. 
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ship;2Is active, questioning participants;216 an array of choices from which deci-
sions are to be selected; assigned evaluative roles; and small task groups.217 
While it is not the purpose of this Article fully to explore these ideas, it is 
important to note that social scientists who have probed the group decisionmak-
ing process and the behavioral patterns that may influence group decisions have 
concluded that changing the process can improve the outcome. They agree, for 
example, that some level of stress within a decisionmaking group is a positive 
force for sound decisionmaking.218 Involving "outsiders" in the discussion of 
complex matters, encouraging group members to caucus with other knowledgea-
ble people away from the decisionmaking group, and convening "second 
chance" meetings to review decisions previously reached are all characteristic of 
well-conceived "quality decisions."219 
The late Irving Janis, a social psychologist at Yale, prescribed nine specific 
practices for optimum group decisionmaking, derived from studies of public pol-
icy choices but each equally applicable to the work of a corporate board: 
1. The leader of a policy-forming group shoud assign the role of criti-
cal evaluator to each member, encouraging the group to give high pri-
ority to airing objections and doubts. This practice needs to be 
reinforced by the leader's acceptance of criticism of his or her own 
judgments in order to discourage the members from soft-pedaling their 
disagreements. 
2. The leaders in an organization's hierarchy, when assigning a policy-
planning mission to a group, should be impartial instead of stating 
preferences and expectations at the outset. This practice requires each 
leader to limit his or her briefings to unbiased statements about the 
scope of the problem and the limitations of available resources, with-
out advocating specific proposals he or she would like to see adopted. 
This allows the conferees the opportunity to develop an atmosphere of 
open inquiry and to explore impartially a wide range of policy 
alternatives. 
3. The organization should routinely follow the administrative prac-
tice of setting up several independent policy-planning and evaluation 
215. Leana, A Partial Test of Janis' Groupthink Model: Effects of Group Cohesiveness and 
Leader Behavior on Defective Decision Making, 11 J. MGMT. 5, 15 (1985). 
216. Callaway, Marriott & Esser, Effects of Dominance on Group Decision Making: Toward a 
Stress-Reduction Explanation of Groupthink, 49 J. PERS. AND Soc. PsYcH. 949 (1985) (groups 
whose members are "dominant"-having a predisposition to argue for their own points ofview-are 
likely to reach high-quality decisions). 
217. Mann & Janis, Decisional Conflict in Organizations, in PRODUCTIVE CONFLICT MANAGE· 
MENT: PERSPECTIVES FOR ORGANIZATIONS 29, 32 (D. Tjosvold & D. Johnson eds. 1983); see also 
I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, 
AND CoMMITMENT 11 (1977). Other characteristics associated with high-quality decisions include a 
collaborative, rather than competitive, process of conflict resolution, Wall, Galanes & Love, Small. 
Task-Oriented Groups: Conflict, Conflict Management, Satisfaction, and Decision Quality, 18 SMALL 
GROUP BEHAV. 31, 34 (1987), and the presence of vigilance, frequent second-guessing, accurate 
information processing and the absence of improbable fantasy chains. Hirokawa, Why Informed 
Groups Make Faulty Decisions: An Investigation of Possible Interaction-Based Explanations, 18 
SMALL GROUP BEHAV. 3, 9 (1987). 
218. Mann & Janis, supra note 217, at 21, 37-38. 
219. /d. at 34. 
HeinOnline -- 69 N.C. L. Rev.  1171 1990-1991
1991] INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
groups to work on the same policy question, each carrying out its de-
liberations under a different leader. 
4. Throughout the period when the feasibility and effectiveness of pol-
icy alternatives are being surveyed, the policy-making group should 
from time to time divide into two or more subgroups to meet sepa-
rately, under different chairpersons, and then come together to ham-
mer out their differences. 
5. Each member of the policy-making group should discuss periodi-
cally the group's deliberations with trusted associates in his or her own 
unit of the organization and report back their reactions. 
6. One or more outside experts or qualified colleagues within the or-
ganization who are not core members of the policy-making group 
should be invited to each meeting on a staggered basis and should be 
encouraged to challenge the views of the core members. 
7. At every meeting devoted to evaluating policy alternatives, at least 
one member should be assigned the role of devil's advocate. 
8. Whenever the policy issue involves relations with a rival nation or 
organization, a sizeable block of time (perhaps an entire session) 
should be spent surveying all warning signals from the rivals and con-
structing alternative scenarios of the rivals' intentions. -
9. After reaching a preliminary consensus about what seems to be the 
best policy alternative, the policy-making group should hold a "second 
chance" meeting at which the members are expected to express as viv-
idly as they can all their residual doubts and to rethink the entire issue 
before making a definitive choice. 22o 
1171 
Most of these practices do not occur within the self-selecting board of direc-
tors today.221 Rather, as noted earlier,222 traditional boards often are character-
ized by social cohesion, 223 restrictive cultural norms, and conventions of 
discourse that tend (1) to overvalue the views of the chairman, (2) to exclude 
consideration of alternative options, and (3) to minimize expression of challeng-
ing views. Consequently, boards of directors, like other elite groups, are often 
subject to the psychological process known as "groupthink,"224 which has been 
defined as: "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply 
involved iri a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity 
override their motivation to appraise realistically alternative courses of 
action. " 225 
220. I. JANIS, GROUPTIIINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FiASCOES 
262-271 (2d. ed. 1983). 
221. See generally J. LoRSCH, supra note 154, at 55-74 (describing typical board practices). 
222. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. 
223. Elmer Johnson refers to this as the "club ethos" among board members. Johnson, An In-
sider's Call for Outside Direction, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 47; see also C. MILLS, THE 
PoWER ELITE 11-12, 122-30 (1963) (describing the common social origins and practices of most 
business leaders). 
224. See generally Swap, Destructive Effects of Groups on Individuals, in GROUP DECISION MAK-
ING 69-95 (W. Swap ed. 1984) (discussing the powerful but detrimental influence a group has over its 
members: social loafing, deindividualizing effects, and pressure on members to arrive at a consensual 
decision that may not be fully developed). 
225. I. JANIS, supra note 220, at 9. 
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Many observers have noted that groupthink often occurs in the board-
room.226 In their deliberations, "[board] members may be[come] so concerned 
with maintaining positive interpersonal relations and reducing conflict that they 
lose the ability or willingness to critically evaluate the risks and advantages of 
decision alternatives. "227 Because of the structure of the board, and the way in 
which it conducts its business, there is seldom opportunity for any real "give and 
take on the issues."228 
A shareholders' advisory committee, which by definition is not part of the 
in-group, might alter this pattern of decisionmaking. A free-standing committee 
would avoid the problems of co-optation that may characterize even the most 
"independent" of corporate boards.229 However, as noted earlier,230 free-stand-
ing advisory committees have many shortcomings. The better option for institu-
tional investors would be to focus their reformational energies on the board itself 
and to seek structural means of minimizing the groupthink phenomenon. 
A preliminary prescription for changing board practices might include a 
number of strategies adopted from the group psychology literature. "New 
boards" could (1) encourage the addition of "untraditional" directors to corpo-
rate boards to reduce the nearly-exclusive reliance on corporate CEOs; (2) en-
courage the use of an outside director as chairman of the board;231 (3) encourage 
wider use of multiple directoral subcommittees, with diverse leaders, to explore 
common issues, and then come together as a group to resolve differences of opin-
ion;232 (4) encourage board members to give high priority to airing their objec-
tions and doubts in the boardroom; (5) encourage CEOs to recognize the value 
of opinion diversity and to develop a discriminating compensation scheme for 
directors that rewards contributions to the governance process; and (6) recog-
nize that board service as redefined will require a greater commitment than has 
been expected of board members in recent years, and will command substan-
tially greater rewards. 
Adopting such practices need not invite decisional paralysis. Obviously, 
boards and their chairmen must be selective and discriminating in assembling 
226. Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implica· 
tions of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 99-104; Dent, supra note 
100, at 899 & n.l02; Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate 
Law, 80 MICH L. REv. 1, 35-39 (1981). 
227. Swap, supra note 224, at 83. 
228. Johnson, supra note 223, at 47. 
229. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 226, at 114-31; Dent, supra note 100, at 909. 
230. See supra notes 185-99 and accompanying text. 
231. Cf. Knowlton & Millstein, Con the Board of Directors Help the American Corporation Earn 
the Immortality It Holds So Dear?, in J. MEYER & J. GUSTAFSON, THE U.S. BUSINESS CORPORA· 
TION-AN INSTITUTION IN TRANsmoN 184 (1988) (recommending that one of the outside direc· 
tors, rather than the CEO, routinely serve as board chair). Currently, only about 21% of American 
public companies assign someone other than the CEO to the position of chairman. KoRN/FERRY 
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 22, at 14. 
232. Peter Drucker tells a story which illustrates the views of Alfred Sloan, former Chairman of 
General Motors, on the value of debate in decisionmaking. At an executive meeting, called to con· 
sider a major decision, Sloan concluded: "Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete agreement on 
the decision here . . . . Then I propose we postpone further discussion until our next meeting to give 
ourselves time to develop disagreement and perhaps gain some understanding of what the decision is 
all about." P. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT, TASKS & RESPONSIBILITIES 472 (1974). 
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information and choosing among alternative strategies; otherwise they would 
waste irrecoverable resources in "a fruitless quest for an elusive, faultless alter-
native."233 Board decisions by definition involve risk and will always be pre-
mised on intangible business judgments, perceptions about timing, and 
unverifiable assumptions about consumer, competitive, and regula.tory behavior. 
Nor are such practices inconsistent with the notion of a monitoring board. In-
sisting that directors become more directly and intensely engaged in the determi-
nation of corporate policy is not the same as asking them to micro-manage the 
enterprise. 
The point is that corporate boards may be able to improve their decisional 
performance and, by extension, their companies' financial performance, if they 
are willing to depart materially from traditional patterns of board composition 
and process. At the very least, in the face of intense international competitive 
pressures, corporate managers should be willing to give these idC"..as a try. 
This kind of transformation will not come easily. Many business leaders 
pride themselves on their resistance to the advice of scholars. In a more narrow 
sense, shareholders in many companies are having difficulty seeming even a sig-
nificant number of outside directors, conventionally selected, 234 let alone trying 
to transform boards' longstanding decisionmaking styles. Business executives 
are understandably reluctant, especially in a time of economic uncertainty, to 
undertake major structural changes in their boards. That is precisely what they 
must try to do, however, because, unless they can create and exploit a "properly 
functioning board," public companies will become an "endangered species."235 
Better corporate governance does not require the creation of a m~w supervisory 
body such as that being promoted by CalPERS, but it does require a sensitized, 
diversified, and participatory board. 
CONCLUSION 
The new-found willingness of many institutional investors to consider 
schemes such as the shareholders' advisory committee and other mechanisms of 
empowerment suggest both a narrow and a broader conclusion. The narrow 
conclusion is that over half of all institutional investors are willing to give seri-
ous thought to the notion of a shareholders' advisory committee on a case-by-
case basis.236 The broader conclusion is that a substantial number of influential 
institutional investors, frustrated by what they perceive as management insensi-
tivity to shareholders' concerns, and often inhibited by the volume of their hold-
ings (or by indexing practices) from profitably selling their shares, are willing to 
233. I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 217, at 13. 
234. See Durgin, Fighting for Independence: Proxy Proposals Seeking Directors Without Com-
pany Ties, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Feb. 18, 1991, at 1, 50; Parker, Funds Shift Target for 
Proxy Season: New Focus Put on Directors, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Oct. 29, 1990, at 1 
Oisting shareholders' proposals for 1991, the purpose of which is to ensure a majority of outside 
directors on corporate boards). Note that in January, at CalPERS' urging, General Motors volunta-
rily amended its bylaws to require a majority of outside directors. Parker, supra note 140, at 6. 
235. Johnson, supra, note 171, at 46. 
236. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. 
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entertain quite radical ideas, including an entirely new model of corporate gov-
ernance, to stimulate better long-term corporate performance. 
This Article has examined only one of these ideas, and concludes that, 
although the concept of a shareholders' advisory committee is intriguing, share-
holders' advisory committees are not the best available response to a growing 
concern about declining corporate performance and declining national competi-
tiveness. The need for an alternative governance structure that involves institu-
tional investors nevertheless remains for two reasons. The first is that 
shareholders generally and iiistitutional shareholders specifically require some 
reassurance that their concerns are still paramount, if no longer exclusive, in the 
governance equation. These shareholders' sense of security understandably has 
been damaged, both with the increase in statutory accommodations for "other 
constituencies,"237 and with the increase in judicial tolerance for schemes that 
disenfranchise them. 238 The second reason is that the existing governance form 
does not work as well as it might, given the current state of our knowledge about 
collegial decisionmaking. 
Institutional investors and corporate managers together must continue to 
examine how boards work and how they can work more effectively. Territorial 
defensiveness and sloganeering239 will not facilitate these discussions. Rather, 
managers and their institutional owners must seek common ground, including a 
deeper understanding of how their traditional arms-length relationships and 
seemingly immutable board practices may be inhibiting corporate success. 
237. See ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential/or Con• 
fusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253 (1990). See generally Coffee, Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance 
As a Multi-Player Game, 18 GEo. L. J. 1495 (1990) (discussing the new role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance); Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and 
Corporate Law, 68 TEx. L. REv. 865 (1990) (urging recognition of stakeholder interests in corporate 
policymaking). 
238. See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (striking down Com· 
mission's mandatory one share-one vote rule, thus permitting public companies to submit dual-class 
recapitalization proposals to their shareholders, notwithstanding known collective action problems); 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A. 2d 1140 (Del. 1990) (upholding corporate 
defense strategy that deprived shareholders of opportunity to participate in a cash tender offer which 
featured a $75 per share premium over market). 
239. See Comment, supra note 25. 
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APPENDIX A 
The 10 Largest Equityholders in the 
FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES Top 50* 
GENERAL MOTORS 
General Motors Savings Trust 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. 
Wellington Mgmt. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Michigan State Treasurer 
Mellon Bank 
CREF 
Bankers Trust 
Rosenberg Inst. Eq. Mgmt. 
NYS Common Retirement 
FoRo MoToR 
Manufacturers National Corp./Detroit/Trustee 
[Employee Savings & Stock Investment Plan] 
Wellington Mgmt. 
Sarofim Fayez 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Bankers Trust 
Mellon Bank 
Michigan State Treasurer 
Capital Research & Mgmt. 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. 
Capital Guardian Trust 
EXXON 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Bankers Trust 
Mellon Bank 
CREF 
Chemical Bank 
NYS Common Retirement 
PNC Financial Corp. 
J.P. Morgan 
Chase Manhattan 
CalPERS 
1175 
• The Fortune 500 is comprised of the largest U.S. industrial corporations, based upon sales. 
This list was published by Fortune Magazine on April 23, 1990. 
The listing of these companies' 10 largest shareholders was derived from Compact Disclosure 
figures as of 12/31/89. Where necessary, clarifying information was secured from the companies' 
most recent proxy statements. 
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INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Bankers Trust 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. 
Mellon Bank 
Michigan State Treasurer 
J.P. Morgan 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
Capital Research & Mgmt. 
NYS Common Retirement 
CalPERS 
GENERAL ELECTRIC 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Bankers Trust 
Mellon Bank 
Sarofim Fayez 
Alliance Capital Mgmt. 
First Security Corp./Utah 
NYS Common Retirement 
FMRCorp. 
CREF 
University of California 
MOBIL 
Employees' Savings Plan 
Mellon Bank 
Wells Fargo Bank 
NYS Common Retirement 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
Lord Abbett & Co. 
Bankers Trust 
Sarofim Fayez 
Rosenberg Inst. Eq. Mgmt. 
Newbolds Asset Mgmt. 
PHILIP MORRIS 
Sarofim Fayez 
Alliance Capital Mgmt. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
CREF 
Bankers Trust 
Capital Research & Mgmt. 
Lazard Freres & Co. 
Mellon Bank 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. 
FMR Corp. 
[Vol. 69 
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CHRYSLER 
Wellington Mgmt. 
Windsor Fund 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. 
Michigan State Treasurer 
Dreman Value Mgmt. Co. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
TCW Asset Mgmt. 
Barrow Hanley Mewhinney 
Trinity Investment Mgmt. 
E.l. DUPONT DE NEMOURS 
JES Developments [Seagram Co.] 
Wilmington Trust Co. 
Mellon Bank 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
Bankers Trust 
Loomis Sayles & Co. 
Sarofim Fayez 
NYS Common Retirement 
PNC Financial Corp. 
TExAco 
Icahn Group 
Manufacturers Hanover 
J.P. Morgan 
Capital Research & Mgmt. 
FMRCorp. 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
Lazard Freres & Co. 
NYS Common Retirement 
Barrow Hanley Mcwhinney 
Oppenheimer & Co. 
CHEVRON 
Chevron Corp. Employee Profit Sharing/Savings Plan 
Pennzoil Co. 
Sarofim Fayez 
Wells Fargo Bank 
NYS Common Retirement 
Mellon Bank 
Bankers Trust 
Chase Manhattan 
CREF 
Rosenberg Inst. Eq. Mgmt. 
1177 
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AMoco 
First National Bank/Chicago/Trustee 
[Employee Savings Plan] 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Bankers Trust 
Mellon Bank 
Invesco Capital Mgmt. 
NYS Common Retirement 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
Sarofim Fayez 
CalPERS 
Alliance Capital Mgmt. 
NYS Teachers Retirement 
SHELL OIL N/ A 
PROCTER & GAMBLE 
Procter & Gamble Profit Sharing Trust 
Procter & Gamble ESOP 
PNC Financial Corp. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
University of California 
Bankers Trust 
Mellon Bank 
Fifth Third Bank/Cincinnati 
Sarofim Fayez 
NYS Common Retirement 
BOEING 
Alliance Capital Mgmt. 
CREF 
Capital Guardian Trust 
Wells Fargo Bank 
IDS Financial Mgmt. 
Bankers Trust 
Miller Anderson & Sherrerd 
Jeimison Assoc. Capital 
Loomis Sayles & Co. 
Kemper Financial Services 
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 
Manufacturers Hanover 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Bankers Trust 
Batterymarch Financial Mgmt. 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
CREF 
Mellon Bank 
NYS Common Retirement 
Dewey Square Investors 
CalPERS 
[Vol. 69 
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UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 
FMRCorp. 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
Newbolds Asset Mgmt. 
Capital Research & Mgmt. 
Batterymarch Financial Mgmt. 
Loomis Sayles & Co. 
Invesco Capital Mgmt. 
Putnam Mgmt. Co. 
Lehman Ark Mgmt. 
Capital Guardian Trust 
Wells Fargo Bank 
EASTMAN KODAK 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
University of California 
Sarofim Fayez 
Bankers Trust 
CREF 
Templeton Galbraith & Hans 
Mellon Bank 
Chase Manhattan 
Lehman Ark Mgmt. 
usx 
Icahn Capital Corp. 
U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
Barberry Corp. 
FMRCorp. 
Lord Abbett & Co. 
Bankers Trust 
Wells Fargo Bank 
National City Bank/Cleveland 
Putnam Mgmt. Co. 
DOW CHEMICAL 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Sarofim Fayez 
Rosenberg Inst. Eq. Mgmt. 
Bankers Trust 
University of California 
Mellon Bank 
CREF 
Wellington Mgmt. 
NYS Common Retirement 
Capital Research & Mgmt. 
1179 
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XEROX 
State Street Bank/Boston/Trustee 
[Employee Stock Option Plan] 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
Barrow Hanley Mewhinney 
FMRCorp. 
United Banks of Colorado 
University of California 
Pioneering Mgmt. Corp. 
Texas Teacher Retirement System 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Bankers Trust 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD 
Wells Fargo Bank 
J.P. Morgan 
Bankers Trust 
Mellon Bank 
University of California 
Aetna Life & Casualty 
NYS Common Retirement 
Harris Bankcorp 
RCM Capital Mgmt. 
Michigan State Treasurer 
PEPSICO 
Sarofim Fayez 
CREF 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Mellon Bank 
Bankers Trust 
Alliance Capital Mgmt. 
State Street Boston Corp. 
State Street Research & Mgmt. 
Lincoln Capital Mgmt. 
NYS Common Retirement 
RJR NABISCO HOLDINGS (N/ A) 
McDONNELL DOUGLAS 
Bankers Trust/Trustee 
[Employee Savings, Investment and Thrift Plan; MDC ESOP] 
Batterymarch Financial Mgmt. 
James F. McDonnell III 
Ivesco Capital Mgmt. 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. 
Bankers Trust 
John F. McDonnell 
Trinity Investment Mgmt. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
FMRCorp. 
[Vol. 69 
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TENNECO 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
FMRCorp. 
Putnam Mgmt. Co. 
Prudential Insurance Co. 
Bankers Trust 
Wells Fargo Bank 
CREF 
Mellon Bank 
Alliance Capital Mgmt. 
NYS Common Retirement 
DIGITAL EQUIPMENT 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. 
Shawmut Corp. 
Michigan State Treasurer 
Rosenberg Inst. Eq. Mgmt. 
Capital Research & Mgmt. 
Kenneth H. Olsen 
University of California 
Oppenheimer & Co. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Capital Guardian Trust 
WESTINGHOUSE ELECfRIC 
Barrow Hanley Mewhineey 
FMRCorp. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Mellon Bank 
Capital Research & Mgmt. 
Bankers Trust 
Capital Guardian Trust 
CREF 
Shearson Lehman Hutton 
Loomis Sayles & Co. 
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL 
First Interstate Bankcorp/Irustee 
[Employee Savings Plan] 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Bankers Trust 
Mellon Bank 
Trinity Investment Mgmt. 
Batterymarch Financial Mgmt. 
CREF 
Texas Teacher Retirement System 
NYS Common Retirement 
CalPERS 
1181 
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PHILLIPS PETROLEM 
Phillips Petroleum Thrift Plan 
Phillips Petroleum Stock Savings Plan 
Batterymarch Financial Mgmt. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Rosenberg Inst. Eq. Mgmt. 
Mellon Bank 
J.P. Morgan 
Bankers Trust 
TCW Asset Mgmt. 
Harris Associates 
ALLIED-SIGNAL 
State Street Bank/Boston/Trustee 
[Allied-Signal Savings Plan] 
State Street Boston Corp. 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
Barrow Hanley Mcwhinney 
Bankers Trust 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Newbolds Asset Mgmt. 
CREF 
Independent Investment Assoc. 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
MINNESOTA MINING & MFG. 
First Bank System 
State Street Boston Corp. 
University of California 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Sarofim Fayez 
Bankers Trust 
Invesco Capital Mgmt. 
NYS Common Retirement 
Miller Anderson & Sherrerd 
Lord Abbett & Co. 
HEWLETT-PACKARD 
David Packard 
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Invesco Capital Mgmt. 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. 
University of California 
Lincoln Capital Mgmt. 
Bankers Trust 
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. 
Mellon Bank 
[Vol. 69 
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SARA LEE 
Mellon Bank 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Alliance Capital Mgmt. 
Capital Supervisors 
First Manhattan Co. 
Chancellor Capital Mgmt. 
CREF 
Bankers Trust 
National City Bank/Cleveland 
NYS Common Retirement 
INTERNATIONAL PAPER 
Bankers Trust/frustee 
[Employee Savings, Thrift and ESOP Plans] 
Manning & Napier Advisory 
Oppenheimer & Co. 
CREF 
Miller Anderson & Sherrerd 
NYS Common Retirement 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Dodge & Cox 
Mellon Bank 
Harris Bankcorp 
CoNAGRA 
Fidelity International Ltd./FMR Corp. 
First Bank System 
Mellon Bank 
Wells Fargo Bank 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
IDS Financial Corp. 
Bankers Trust 
CREF 
Independent Investors Ass'n 
U.S. Trust 
ALUMINMUM Co. OF AMERICA 
Wellington Mgmt. 
Michael H. Steinhardt 
Mellon Bank 
Alcoa Savings Plan 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. 
Batterymarch Financial Mgmt. 
Lord Abbett & Co. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Loomis Sayles & Co. 
NYS Common Retirement 
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CATERPILLAR 
Capital Research & Mgmt. 
Lord Abbett & Co. 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. 
United Banks of Colorado 
Newbolds Asset Mgmt. 
Alliance Capital Mgmt. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton 
Dodge& Cox 
Michael H. Steinhardt 
Wells Fargo Bank 
GooDYEAR TIRE & RUBBER 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. 
FMRCorp. 
Batterymarch Financial Mgmt. 
Loomis Sayles & Co. 
Trinity Investment Mgmt. 
Capital Research & Mgmt. 
Hotchkiss and Wiley 
J.P. Morgan 
Bankers Trust 
Wellington Mgmt. Co. 
UNOCAL 
Security Pacific Corp./Trustee 
[Unocal Profit Sharing Plan and ESOP] 
Alliance Capital Mgmt. 
Lazard Freres & Co. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
TCW Asset Mgmt. 
Bankers Trust 
Loomis Sayles & Co. 
RCM Capital Mgmt. 
FMRCorp. 
Ohio State Teachers Retirement 
GEORGIA-PACIFIC 
University of California 
CREF 
Harris Bankcorp 
Manning & Napier Advisory 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Trinity Investment Mgmt. 
Rosenberg Inst. Eq. Mgmt. 
Bankers Trust 
Templeton Galbraith 
Texas Teacher Retirement System 
[Vol. 69 
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WEYERHAEUSER 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Capital Research & Mgmt. 
Bankers Trust 
Bank of California 
Miller Anderson & Sherrerd 
Pioneering Mgmt. Corp. 
Dodge& Cox 
First Bank System 
CREF 
UNISYS 
FMRCorp. 
Cahsman Farrell & Assoc. 
Trinity Investment Mgmt. 
Texas Teacher Retirement System 
Lehman Ark Mgmt. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Wilmington Capital Mgmt. 
Loomis Sayles & Co. 
Bankers Trust 
J.P. Morgan 
GENERAL DYNAMICS 
Lester Crown and James S. Crown 
Batterymarch Financial Mgmt. 
Trinity Investment Mgmt. 
Invesco Capital Mgmt. 
Boston Co. 
C.H. Dean & Assoc. 
Bankers Trust 
Wells Fargo Bank 
J.P. Morgan 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. 
LoCKHEED 
U.S. Trust of California/Trustee 
[Lockheed ESOP Feature Trust] 
Invesco Capital Mgmt. 
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. 
Trinity Investment Mgmt. 
Loomis Sayles & Co. 
N.L. Industries Inc. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Heine Securities 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
Boston Co. 
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SUN 
Glenmede Trust Co./Trustee 
[Pew Memorial Trust and other trusts and estates] 
Mellon Bank 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Bankers Trust 
CREF 
NYS Common Retirement 
NYS Teachers Retirement 
Philadelphia National Bank 
CalPERS 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Bankers Trust 
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. 
University of California 
Mellon Bank 
PNC Financial Corp. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton 
Wilmington Trust Co. 
NYS Common Retirement 
MOTOROLA 
Robert W. Galvin 
Harris Bankcorp 
capital Research & Mgmt. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
capital Guardian Trust 
Lord Abbett & Co. 
Alliance capital Mgmt. 
Bankers Trust 
Kemper Financial Services 
Investors Research Corp. 
ANHEUSER-BUSCH 
Boatmen's Bancshares 
Mercantile Bane/Missouri 
Sarofim Fayez 
Lazard Freres & Co. 
Bankers Trust 
Wells Fargo Bank 
capital Research & Mgmt. 
CREF 
J.P. Morgan 
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BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB 
Bankers Trust 
Delaware Mgmt. Co. 
PNC Financial Corp. 
Boston Co. 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Boatmen's Bancshares 
CREF 
NYS Common Retirement 
Alliance Capital Mgmt. 
Mellon Bank 
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